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What do people see when they gaze into the future?  Many people, at least 
among those in Western cultures, see a future brimming with possibilities.  
The past, on the other hand, is rarely described as being full of possibility.  
This is not surprising, as the future is associated with a greater number of 
possible outcomes, is unknown, and is potentially changeable, whereas 
the past is associated with fewer possible outcomes, is known or 
potentially knowable, and cannot be changed.  In this dissertation, I argue 
that because people associate the future with openness and possibility 
more so than the past, they tend to see any particular uncertain event as 
more probable in the future than in the past, all else being equal.  That is, 
people judge focal future events to be more likely than otherwise identical 
past events, once differences in knowledge of the past and future are 
eliminated.  I report a series of studies aimed at documenting this 
phenomenon and testing the proposed mechanism, the tendency to 
associate the future with openness and possibility.  In Chapter Two, I 
describe three studies demonstrating this past-future asymmetry in 
likelihood judgments and testing some of the parameters of this 
phenomenon.  In Chapter Three, I report the results of three studies that 
provide support for the hypothesized cause of this effect, the association 
between the future and possibility.  In Chapter Four, I describe two 
 studies examining some extensions of this effect beyond the realm of 
likelihood judgments.  Finally, in Chapter Five I discuss some 
implications and boundary conditions of this effect, and outline future 
directions for this work. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
What do people see when they gaze into the future?  Many people, 
at least among those in Western cultures, see a future brimming with 
possibilities.  This tendency to see the future as full of possibility is 
reflected in everyday language, as when people say that the “future is 
wide open” or tell their children “you can be anything you want to be.”  
This tendency is also reflected in the popular culture, as when science 
fiction novels and films feature fantastic visions of the future that are 
rarely realized when the depicted era actually arrives.   
The past, on the other hand, is rarely described as being full of 
possibility.  This is not surprising, as the past is fixed in a way that the 
future is not.  Multiple possibilities exist for the outcome of any uncertain 
future event, whereas only one outcome exists for any given past event. 
The future is not yet known, whereas in many cases the past is known or, 
at least, potentially knowable.  The future may yet be shaped by human 
actions (at least according to some philosophical positions), whereas the 
past cannot be changed.  For all of these reasons, we can describe the 
future as more “open” than the past. 
What are the implications of this difference in the openness of the 
past and future for the way in which people think about uncertain past and 
future events?  I propose that because people see more possibility in the 
future than in the past, they tend to see any particular uncertain event as 
more possible – and hence more probable – in the future than in the past.  
In certain cases such a tendency is perfectly rational.  I know I have never 
won the lottery before, for example, so the chances I will win the lottery 
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in the future – even if miniscule – are necessarily greater than the chances 
that I have won the lottery in the past.  In cases where the past is just as 
uncertain as the future, however, the timing of an event should not 
influence perceptions of its likelihood.  Until I check the winning 
numbers, the chances that my lottery ticket will be worth millions are the 
same five minutes before the drawing as they are five minutes afterward.  
But because I associate the future with openness and possibility more so 
than the past, I may judge my chances of winning to be higher before the 
winning numbers are drawn than after they are drawn, even though it is 
irrational to do so. 
In what follows I will present a series of studies aimed at testing 
this hypothesis, that people judge uncertain future events to be more likely 
than equivalent past events even when differences in knowledge of the 
past and future are eliminated.  After documenting this timing effect in 
likelihood judgments, I will test the proposed mechanism: the tendency to 
associate the future with openness and possibility more so than the past.  
Finally, I will explore some extensions of this phenomenon beyond the 
realm of likelihood judgments.   
The Open Future 
As noted above, there are many ways in which we can consider the 
future to be more open than the past.  The future is associated with a 
greater number of possibilities, is unknown, and is potentially changeable, 
whereas the past is associated with fewer possibilities, is known or 
potentially knowable, and cannot be changed.  The knowledge that the 
future is more open than the past may lead people to treat past and future 
events quite differently.  Indeed, previous research has documented a 
 3 
number of differences in the way people describe, explain, and understand 
past and future events.  For example, Bavelas (1973) asked participants to 
create an itinerary for a fictional vacation, said to take place in either the 
following year or the previous year.  Although participants listed more 
vacation spots when imagining a past vacation, they generated more 
unique ideas when imaging a future vacation.  Similar results were 
obtained by Watzke and Webb (cited in Weick, 1979).  They conducted a 
study several days before the 1970 Super Bowl in which participants were 
asked to imagine it was either the day before or the day after the game, 
and to describe how the game would/did unfold.  Participants imagining 
that the game would happen tomorrow wrote more variable and more 
creative accounts of what would happen in the game than did those 
imagining that the game happened yesterday.  Even though participants 
had no more knowledge of the past than of the future in these studies, they 
imagined that the future would be more unique and unusual than the past.  
In addition to approaching the future with a more creative mindset, 
people appear to give more weight to temporary or transient factors 
relative to stable ones when predicting future events than when 
“postdicting” past events.  Sanna and Swim (1992) asked participants to 
imagine a past or future academic experience (either “acing” or failing a 
test) and then to judge the causes of their imagined behavior.  Participants 
were more likely to attribute their behavior to stable causes (both internal 
and external to themselves) when imaging past behavior than when 
imagining future behavior.  Similarly, Grant and Tybout (2007) found that 
participants asked to predict the success of a future marketing campaign 
were more likely to take into account temporary factors associated with 
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the product launch (i.e., current market conditions) than were those asked 
to postdict the success of a past marketing campaign.  The results of these 
studies suggest that, in comparison to uncertain past events, people see 
uncertain future events as less fixed, as more malleable and open to 
change. 
This tendency to see the future as full of unique possibilities is not 
limited to adults.  Even young children seem to imbue the future with 
more possibility than the past.  In one experiment (Robinson, Rowley, 
Beck, Carroll & Apperly, 2006), children set out mats to catch a block 
that would fall to the ground after being pushed through one of several 
elevated doors.  The children were more likely to set out multiple mats 
(one under each door from which the block might emerge) if the 
experimenter had yet to place the block behind a door than if the block 
had already been positioned behind one of the doors.  In this latter case, 
the children tended to set out just one mat, as though they had difficulty 
recognizing that there was more than one place the block could be.  These 
results suggest that young children find it easier to acknowledge multiple 
possibilities when they are dealing with uncertain future events than when 
they are dealing with uncertain past events.  Indeed, the ability to 
acknowledge competing possibilities for uncertain past events does not 
seem to emerge until the age of 7 or 8 (Robinson et al., 2006). 
 The tendency to associate the future with openness and possibility 
may help to explain why many sports fans are averse to watching pre-
recorded sports events that they would happily watch live.  According to 
Vosgerau, Wertenbroch and Carmon (2006), live matches are more 
exciting to watch than pre-recorded ones precisely because they are as-of-
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yet unresolved.  Even if the outcome of a match is unknown to the sports 
fan, they argue, the fact that the match has already occurred makes it seem 
more determined and hence less exciting to watch.  Although Vosgerau et 
al. do not state this explicitly, their account seems to imply that 
determined events are less exciting because it seems less likely that 
something terribly thrilling and unexpected will happen.  A tendency to 
endow the future with more potential than the past may also help to 
explain why people tend to underweight past experiences when predicting 
similar future ones.  For example, people routinely underestimate how 
long it will take them to complete a variety of tasks despite a wealth of 
past experience suggesting such tasks are likely to take longer than they 
think (Buehler, Griffin & Ross, 1994).  This planning fallacy is 
understandable, however, if people assume that the future will afford them 
opportunities that the past did not.  The fact that I did not manage to write 
a paper, clean my entire apartment, and finish my grading last weekend, 
for example, doesn’t mean it isn’t possible to get all of these tasks done 
next weekend. 
The Likely Future 
An asymmetry in the openness of the past and future may also have 
implications for the way in which people judge the likelihood of past and 
future events.  If the future is more open than the past, people may be 
likely to judge any particular event to be more possible – and hence more 
probable – in the future than in the past, all other things being equal.  That 
is, controlling for differences in knowledge of the past versus the future, 
people may see uncertain future events to be more likely than equivalent 
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past events because they associate the future with possibility more so than 
the past.   
Is there any evidence to support this claim?  Although some studies 
have examined beliefs about the likelihood of past versus future events, 
these investigations have typically focused on events for which there is an 
asymmetry in knowledge of the past versus the future.  For example, 
research on the hindsight bias has found that, after learning the outcome 
of a past event, people tend to believe they “knew it all along”—to see 
that particular outcome as more likely in retrospect than they would have 
in prospect (Fischhoff, 1975).  Given that the aim of this research program 
is to examine the biasing influence of outcome information, these studies 
necessarily create an imbalance in information, comparing people’s 
beliefs about the likelihood of some outcome before versus after learning 
the true outcome.  Thus, these studies cannot shed light on the question of 
whether people will see future events as more probable than equivalent 
past events when information about the past and future is held constant. 
Only a handful of investigations have compared beliefs about past 
versus future events when differences in knowledge of the past versus the 
future are eliminated.  Although limited in number, the results of these 
studies suggest that people do see at least certain kinds of focal outcomes 
as more likely in the future than in the past.  Rothbart and Snyder (1970), 
for example, found that participants betting on the outcome of a die roll 
expressed more confidence in their bets, and were willing to wager more 
money on them, if they were allowed to predict the outcome of the roll in 
advance than if they were asked to “postdict” the outcome after the die 
had been rolled (but before they were allowed to see the outcome).  
 7 
Similarly, Strickland, Lewicki and Katz (1966) found that participants 
chose riskier bets – that is, bets with lower odds of winning but higher 
payoffs – when betting on a die before it was rolled than when betting 
after the die was rolled.   
Rothbart and Snyder (1970) interpreted their results as evidence of 
magical thinking in situations that encourage illusory perceptions of 
control. The idea is that people believe, however implicitly, that they can 
influence the outcome of a future die roll more so than the outcome of a 
past die roll, and thus they are more confident about their chances of 
winning in the former case than in the latter.  Also consistent with this 
argument is the finding that individuals are more likely to cooperate in a 
prisoner’s dilemma game if they choose their move before their partner 
chooses his or hers than if they move after their partner has made a choice 
(Morris, Sim & Girotto, 1998). 
Some authors have rejected this magical thinking interpretation, 
however.  Brun and Teigen (1990) argued that people are more confident 
in prediction than in postdiction because of an asymmetry in the extent to 
which one’s internal uncertainty is mirrored by external uncertainty.  In 
the case of prediction, it is perfectly reasonable to be uncertain as the 
future outcome is not yet knowable.  In the case of postdiction, however, 
there is an imbalance between what the individual knows and what is in 
fact knowable.  This imbalance is aversive, and thus people feel more 
comfortable predicting the outcome of events in advance, and feel more 
confident in their predictions when they do so (see Fox & Tversky, 1995, 
for a similar argument regarding ambiguity aversion). 
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Another possibility, however, is that people simply associate the 
future with openness and possibility more so than the past, and thus they 
tend to see any focal uncertain event (not just those for which people 
harbor illusions of control) as more probable in the future than in the past.  
When Rothbart and Snyder (1970) asked their participants how confident 
they were in their guesses, participants likely attempted to estimate the 
probability of the die coming up the way they called it.  If there is a 
tendency for people to see such possibilities as more likely in the future 
(i.e., in prediction) than in the past (i.e., in postdiction), this would 
account for the differences in participants’ reported confidence and the 
size of the bets they were willing to place.  This would also account for 
Brun and Teigen’s (1990) finding that when given the choice, people 
prefer prediction over postdiction, as they may feel more confident when 
predicting future outcomes than when postdicting past ones.  In addition 
to explaining previous research findings, this account predicts that we 
should see an asymmetry in likelihood estimates when people are asked to 
predict a wide range of past and future outcomes even when people have 
no control (either real or illusory) over the events in question.   
But why should seeing the future as more open than the past lead to 
higher likelihood estimates for future events?  After all, if all things are 
more possible in the future than in the past, shouldn’t this entail that any 
particular thing is less possible in the future than in the past?  I believe 
the key to resolving this apparent contradiction lies in the well-
documented tendency for people to focus on a small subset of the 
available information when making predictions, testing hypotheses, and 
evaluating evidence (Klayman & Ha, 1987; Snyder & Swann, 1978; 
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Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert & Axsom, 2000).  This focalism 
means that when people are considering the likelihood of an event’s 
occurrence, either in the future or in the past, they are unlikely to spend 
much time thinking about other events that may prevent, crowd out, or 
otherwise interfere with the focal event.  Instead, they may only briefly 
review the evidence directly related to the occurrence of the focal event.  
Because they fail to consider competing events or outcomes, then, people 
may tend to judge only the focal event as more likely in the future than in 
the past.  
In this dissertation I report a series of studies aimed to test the 
hypothesis that because people associate the future (but not the past) with 
openness and possibility, they tend to see uncertain future events as more 
likely than identical past events, all else being equal.  In Chapter Two, I 
describe three studies that document this past-future asymmetry in 
likelihood judgments and test some of the parameters of this phenomenon.  
In Chapter Three, I report the results of three studies that provide support 
for the hypothesized cause of this effect, the association between the 
future and possibility.  In Chapter Four, I describe two studies examining 
some extensions of this effect beyond the realm of likelihood judgments.  
Finally, in Chapter Five I discuss some implications and boundary 
conditions of this effect, and outline future directions for this work. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
WHEN THE FUTURE IS MORE LIKELY THAN THE PAST 
 In this chapter I report the results of three studies that examined 
whether people judge uncertain future events to be more likely than 
identical past events, all other things being equal.  In each study, 
participants judged the likelihood that one or more focal events would 
occur in the future or did occur in the past.  I took care to ask about events 
that, normatively speaking, were no more likely to happen at one time 
than another.  Thus, I avoided topics that are subject to historical trends as 
well as those for which participants might have knowledge (either real or 
inferred) of past events.1  This allowed me to focus on the effect of merely 
describing something as a past or future event on people’s beliefs about 
that event. 
In Study 1, I asked participants to estimate the likelihood that a 
target person would experience, or would have experienced, a variety of 
events over the course of a given one-week period.  Some participants 
provided these estimates for a week in the near future whereas others did 
so for a week in the recent past.  I predicted that participants would tend 
to see the events as more likely if they were asked about a future week 
than if they were asked about a past week.  In Study 2, I replicated the 
results of Study 1 in another context (judging the likelihood of a mentally 
ill individual attempting suicide) and examined whether this effect is 
                                                
1 By real knowledge, I mean that an individual possesses some knowledge indicating 
that an event either did or did not occur in the past.  By inferred knowledge, I mean 
that an individual possesses the belief that had this event occurred, he would have 
heard about it, and thus he can infer from his ignorance that the event did not in fact 
occur. 
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moderated by the overall frequency of the event in question – that is, 
whether it is rare or common in general.  In Study 3, I asked participants 
to judge the likelihood that they themselves had experienced certain 
events in the past and the likelihood that they would experience those 
same events in the future.  Because people often know that they have 
experienced a particular event at some point in the past, but are less likely 
to know whether they experienced that event on a specific date in the past, 
I asked participants to judge the likelihood that they had experienced the 
events in question on a specific date in the distant past.  This procedure 
minimized the possibility that participants would have greater knowledge 
of the past than of the future, and allowed me to focus solely on the 
question of whether people see a variety of events as more likely to 
happen to them in the future than to have happened to them in the past. 
Study 1:  Everyday Events 
Method 
Seventy-seven participants (46 female, ages 18 to 39, with a 
median age of 20) were recruited at public locations on the Cornell 
campus and asked to complete several short questionnaires in exchange 
for a candy bar.  The current study always appeared first in the set of 
questionnaires. 
Participants read a short description of a target person named Jen 
and then rated the likelihood of Jen experiencing each of 12 everyday 
events over the course of a particular week.  Two versions of the 
questionnaire were created, and were randomly distributed to participants.  
Half rated the likelihood that Jen would experience each of the events 
sometime during the following week, whereas the other half rated the 
 12 
likelihood that she had experienced those same events sometime during 
the prior week.  Thus, the two versions of the questionnaire were identical 
except that one asked for judgments about future events whereas the other 
asked for judgments about past events.  
The description of Jen, which was meant to give participants some 
basis for their judgments without providing information that would make 
any particular event seem certain to happen or certain not to happen, was 
as follows: 
Jen is a typical Cornell undergraduate.  She is a junior, majoring in 
Economics and minoring in French.  She is originally from the 
West Coast, and although she misses the California sunshine, she 
would like to move to New York City after graduation.  Jen can 
often be found studying in Olin library, a vanilla latte from the café 
in hand.  In her spare time, Jen likes to watch movies at the Cornell 
cinema and hang out with her roommates. 
After reading this description, participants judged the likelihood of Jen 
experiencing each of the 12 events during the specified time period.  Care 
was taken to select events that would be equally likely to occur regardless 
of the time period in question (see Table 2.1, below, for the list of 
events).2  Ratings were made on 7-point scales anchored at 1 (“extremely 
unlikely”) and 7 (“extremely likely”). 
                                                
2 Despite my best intentions, one item I selected was in fact tied to external 
circumstances that differed depending on the time period in question. The data for this 
study were collected at the beginning of a particularly rainy week in October that 
came on the heels of a rather sunny week. Thus, participants had an a priori reason to 
find it less likely that Jen would go on a hike in the upcoming week than that she had 
gone on a hike in the previous week. Because the direction of this reasoning runs 
contrary to my hypothesis, however, removing this item would only strengthen the 
results. 
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Results and Discussion 
Because mean judgments differed substantially depending on the 
event in question, ratings for each event were normalized and the resulting 
z-scores were averaged to form a composite measure of likelihood.  This 
composite was subjected to a 2 (timing: past vs. future) x 2 (gender) 
analysis of variance (ANOVA).  This analysis revealed only a main effect 
of timing, F(1, 73) = 4.59, p < .05.  Overall, participants believed it more 
likely that the events would occur over the following week (M = .11, SD = 
.43) than that they had occurred over the prior week (M = - .10, SD = .38).  
This pattern of higher likelihood estimates for future than for past events 
occurred for 10 of the 12 individual items, a significant result according to 
the sign test, p < .05.  The individual means are displayed in Table 2.1. 
To explore whether these findings apply equally to positive and 
negative events, I asked a separate sample of 30 participants to rate the 
valence of each of the 12 events on 7-point scales anchored at 1 
(“extremely negative”) and 7 (“extremely positive”).  Then, for each item, 
I computed the mean difference between the likelihood ratings given by 
participants in each of the two conditions, and regressed this difference 
onto the mean positivity of that item.  This analysis showed no 
relationship between the size of the past-future effect and the valence of 
the item, β = - .001, r = - .003, t(10) < 1, ns.  Thus, it appears that the 
tendency to judge uncertain outcomes as more likely in the future than in 
the past applies equally to positive and negative events, and is not due to 
greater optimism (i.e., believing only that positive events are more likely) 
when predicting the future. 
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Table 2.1 
Mean likelihood ratings for events in Study 1, by temporal perspective 
Item Future Past Difference 
Argue with a friend 4.21 3.97 0.24 
Arrive late to class 4.32 3.87 0.45 
Begin a diet 3.89 3.10 0.79 
Begin a romantic relationship 3.71 2.79 0.92 
Call parents 5.41 5.18 0.23 
Do laundry 5.32 4.90 0.42 
Feel sad 5.03 4.90 0.13 
Go on a hike 2.21 2.54 -0.33 
Go to a party 5.29 4.85 0.54 
Go to the gym 4.54 4.13 0.41 
Go to office hours 4.95 5.05 -0.10 
Treat a friend to dinner 3.76 3.79 -0.03 
Average 4.38 4.09 0.29 
 
Study 2:  Base Rates 
 The results of Study 1 support the hypothesis that people see 
uncertain future events as more likely than identical past events, all other 
things being equal.  In a second study, I aimed to replicate Study 1 in a 
different context, and to examine whether this effect is moderated by the 
frequency of the events in question.  I hypothesize that because people 
associate the future with openness and possibility, they will tend to see 
focal uncertain events as more likely in the future than in the past.  
Another possibility, however, is that people prefer not to think very 
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carefully about the future before it arrives, and thus they tend to hold 
overly-simplified visions of the future.  This account predicts that likely 
events will be seen as more likely in the future, but that unlikely events 
will be seen as even less likely.  Although I asked about a variety of 
events in Study 1, all of the events were ones that were fairly common in 
undergraduate life.  As Study 1 alone cannot rule out this alternative 
account, in Study 2 I varied the prior base rate of the event in order to 
examine whether thinking about the future elevates probability estimates, 
or simply makes them more extreme. 
Method 
Participants were 80 Cornell undergraduates who volunteered to 
complete a brief questionnaire in the Social Psychology laboratory while 
waiting to be called in for another experiment.  The study employed a 2 
(base rate: high vs. low) x 2 (timing: past vs. future) between-subjects 
design.  Participants read that a particular psychiatric disorder was 
associated with either a relatively high or a relatively low risk of suicide.  
Participants in the High Base Rate condition were told that 80 percent of 
patients with this disorder attempt suicide within five years of their 
release from inpatient care, whereas those in the Low Base Rate condition 
were told that this number was 20 percent.  Participants then read a brief 
description of “Mr. S.,” a 26-year old man said to suffer from this 
psychiatric disorder.  As in Study 1, the description was intended to give 
participants some basis for their judgments without biasing them toward 
believing suicide was especially likely or especially unlikely.  The 
description was as follows: 
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Mr. S. is a 26 year-old man who suffers from this psychiatric 
disorder.  Diagnosed at the age of 21, Mr. S. spent about four 
years in outpatient therapy, but was hospitalized at the age of 
25 after suffering an acute mental breakdown.  Mr. S. spent 
nine months in the hospital, where he received a combination of 
drug, group, and one-on-one therapies.  Upon his release from 
the hospital, his doctor wrote the following in his case file: “Mr. 
S.’s condition has greatly improved in the last nine months.  
Although he occasionally experiences severe mood swings, he 
is generally stable and has made significant advances in his 
journey towards self-acceptance.” 
Participants were then asked to judge the likelihood of Mr. S. attempting 
suicide within a specific five-year period on a 9-point scale anchored at 1 
(“not at all likely”) and 9 (“highly likely”).  Half were asked imagine that 
it was the day of Mr. S’s release from the hospital, and to predict the 
likelihood that he would attempt suicide sometime in the next five years.  
The other half were asked to imagine that it was five years after Mr. S’s 
release, and to postdict the likelihood that he had attempted suicide 
sometime in the past five years.   
Results and Discussion 
A 2 (timing: past vs. future) x 2 (base rate: high vs. low) ANOVA 
on likelihood ratings revealed a main effect of base rate, F(1, 76) = 18.21, 
p < .0005.  Not surprisingly, participants rated Mr. S.’s chances of 
attempting suicide to be higher when the base rate of this behavior was 
high (M = 6.2, SD = 1.9) than when it was low (M = 4.4, SD = 1.8).  More 
important, this analysis also revealed a significant main effect of timing, 
 17 
F(1, 76) = 4.36, p < .05.  Participants rated his likelihood of attempting 
suicide to be higher when they were predicting his future behavior (M = 
5.8, SD = 1.8) than when they were postdicting his past behavior (M = 
4.9, SD = 2.2).  There was no hint of an interaction between timing and 
base rate, F(1, 76) < 1, suggesting that the effect of temporal perspective 
did not depend on the prior base rate of the event in question.  Participants 
believed a future suicide attempt was more likely than a past attempt 
regardless of whether suicide attempts in general were common or rare 
among individuals with this disorder.  These results support the 
hypothesis that people generally judge uncertain future events to be more 
likely than identical past events, and do not support the alternative 
possibility that people simply see the future in more deterministic terms 
than the past. 
One may ask what these findings mean for formal models of 
probabilistic reasoning such as Bayes’ rule.  Bayes’ rule is a normative 
model that explains how to calculate the probability of an event when 
information is uncertain, and is often used to revise the degree of support 
for a hypothesis in light of new information.  Although research suggests 
that people often fail to reason according to Bayesian principles in 
everyday judgment and decision making (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973), 
legal and medical practitioners are routinely trained to use Bayes’ rule to 
estimate the probability of some outcome, such as the death of a patient or 
the guilt of a defendant, based on the available evidence.  If people judge 
the likelihood of uncertain future events to be higher than that of 
comparable past events, how might this affect the use of Bayes’ rule? 
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One way to answer this question is to examine how Bayes’ rule 
would apply to the judgment participants made in Study 2.  According to 
Bayes’ rule, the probability of Mr. S. attempting suicide given the 
personality sketch provided by his doctor is defined by the following 
equation: 
 
P(suicide | sketch) =   P(sketch | suicide) * P(suicide)   
       P(sketch) 
where 
P(sketch | suicide) = the probability of a person having this particular 
personality sketch given that he or she attempts suicide 
P(suicide) = the probability of an individual attempting suicide in general 
P(sketch) = P(sketch | suicide) * P(suicide) + P (sketch | no suicide) * 
P(no suicide), or the probability of an individual having this 
particular personality sketch in general (summed across those who 
attempt suicide and those who do not). 
 
The question, then, is where in the above equation might the timing 
of the judgment exert an influence?   P(suicide), the prior probability of a 
suicide attempt, is fixed by the scenario (as either .20 or .80) and seems 
unlikely to be influenced by the timing of the judgment.  On the other 
hand, P(sketch | suicide), the probability of an individual having this 
particular personality sketch given a suicide attempt, might be influenced 
by the timing of the judgment.  In particular, participants judging the 
likelihood of a future suicide attempt might interpret this parameter as the 
likelihood of having this particular personality sketch given that one is 
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going to attempt suicide, whereas those judging the likelihood of a past 
suicide attempt might interpret it as the likelihood of having this 
personality sketch given that one has attempted suicide.  This would lead 
to different estimates both for P(sketch | suicide) and for P(sketch), which 
relies on P(sketch | suicide), and ultimately to different estimates for P 
(suicide | sketch) depending on the time period in question. 
The above analysis suggests that even if practitioners use Bayes’ 
rule appropriately, the timing of the event in question may bias some of 
the parameter estimates used in calculating the probability of interest.  For 
example, a doctor estimating the probability that a patient has recently 
developed a particular disease may come to a different conclusion than a 
doctor estimating the probability that that same patient will soon develop 
the disease, even if they are basing their estimates on the very same test 
result.  This could have important consequences for how these doctors 
approach the issue of treatment, and thus for the patient’s ultimate health 
and survival.  These conclusions are speculative, as I did not ask 
participants in Study 2 for their estimates of P(sketch | suicide), but they 
do suggest that a closer look into how individuals use Bayes’ rule when 
calculating the likelihood of past and future events should be a goal of 
future research. 
Study 3:  Predicting vs. Postdicting the Self  
In the studies reported thus far, I asked participants to make 
judgments about the likelihood of other people experiencing positive or 
negative outcomes, and found that participants believe both positive and 
negative events are more likely in the future than in the past.  One might 
ask whether these same findings would hold if people were making 
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judgments about their own chances of experiencing positive and negative 
outcomes.  A number of researchers have found that people see their own 
futures in positive terms, believing, for example, that they are more likely 
than their peers to experience positive events and less likely than their 
peers to experience negative events over the course of their lives 
(Weinstein, 1980).  If people are motivated to believe they have bright 
and healthy futures, then, the tendency to see future events as more likely 
than past events may hold only for positive and neutral self-relevant 
events, and may be nonexistent (or even reversed) for negative self-
relevant events. 
To test this hypothesis, I asked participants in a third study to make 
judgments about the likelihood of experiencing a variety of events in their 
own lives.  Unlike the first two studies, Study 3 used a within-subjects 
design, in which all participants judged both past and future events.  In 
order to minimize differences in participants’ knowledge of their own 
pasts versus futures, I asked participants to judge the likelihood of 
experiencing these events on a specific date in the past or future.  Because 
participants are unlikely to know exactly what happened to them on a 
random day in the past, I was able to examine the effect of simply 
situating an event in the past or future on participants’ beliefs about the 
likelihood of that event. 
Method 
 Thirty-nine Cornell undergraduates participated in the present 
study, which took the form of a two-page questionnaire distributed in a 
packet of unrelated surveys being collected by various researchers in the 
Social Psychology laboratory.  On one page of the questionnaire, 
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participants were asked to judge the likelihood that they would engage in 
a variety of behaviors on a particular day in the future; on the other page, 
they were asked to judge the likelihood that they had engaged in those 
same behaviors on a particular day in the past.  More specifically, the 
instructions on the Future page read: 
Few people know exactly what they will be doing on a 
particular day in the distant future.  But we are interested in 
your beliefs about what you are likely to do on a particular day 
in the future.  In this case, we are interested in what you believe 
you will do exactly one year from today, on this date in 2008.  
Thus, please rate the likelihood that you will engage in each of 
the following behaviors on this date exactly one year from now 
by circling a number on the scale next to each behavior.  Please 
limit your reports to your beliefs about what you are likely to 
do over the course of that one day. 
Participants then encountered a list of 12 events, and rated the likelihood 
that they would experience each of those events on the specified date 
using a 7-point scale anchored at 1 (“extremely unlikely”) and 7 
(“extremely likely”) (see Table 2.2, below, for the list of events).  The 
instructions for the Past page were almost identical to those for the Future 
page, except that participants were asked to judge the likelihood that they 
had experienced those same events “exactly one year ago, on this date in 
2006.”  The order of the two pages was counterbalanced across 
participants such that some participants made judgments about the future 
first, whereas others made judgments about the past first. 
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Results and Discussion 
 To examine the effect of timing across items, I created two 
composites:  the Future composite, which was the mean of participants’ 
12 likelihood estimates for the future day, and the Past composite, which 
was the mean of participants’ 12 likelihood estimates for the past day.  A 
mixed-model ANOVA with timing (past vs. future) as a within-subjects 
variable and order (future first vs. past first) as a between-subjects 
variable revealed the predicted main effect of timing, F(1, 37) = 8.91, p < 
.005.  Overall, participants believed they would be more likely to 
experience the 12 events one year into the future than that they had 
experienced those same events one year into the past (Ms = 3.86 and 3.60, 
respectively).  The means for each item are displayed in Table 2.2.3 
As in Study 1, I asked a separate sample of participants (n = 13) to 
rate the valence of each of the 12 events on 7-point scales anchored at 1 
(“extremely negative”) and 7 (“extremely positive”), in order to examine 
whether the timing effect is moderated by the valence of the events.  For 
each event, I computed the mean difference between the past and future 
likelihood ratings given by participants, and regressed this difference onto 
the mean positivity of that item.  This analysis revealed a significant 
positive relationship between the size of the past-future difference and the 
valence of the item, β = .278, r = .68, t(10) = 2.92, p < .05.  The more 
                                                
3 This analysis also revealed a marginally significant tendency for participants to 
provide higher likelihood judgments overall when they made judgments about the 
future first than when they made judgments about the past first, Ms = 3.91 and 3.57, 
respectively, F(1, 37) = 3.92, p < .06.  This finding is understandable if participants’ 
first set of likelihood estimates served as an anchor for their second set of estimates.  
Because participants provided higher likelihood estimates for future events than for 
past events, those who judged future events first started with a higher anchor than 
those who judged past events first.   
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positive an event was, the more likely participants were to see it as more 
probable in the future than in the past.   
 
Table 2.2 
Mean likelihood ratings by temporal perspective, and mean positivity 
ratings for each event in Study 3 
 Likelihood 
Event Positivity Future Past Difference 
Eat cereal for breakfast 5.31 3.44 3.00 0.44 
Wear something red 4.15 3.69 2.97 0.72 
Have a phone conversation > 30 mins. 4.67 4.54 3.90 0.64 
Cook dinner 5.00 3.33 2.03 1.31 
Feel lonely 1.77 3.31 3.82 - 0.51 
Exercise or play a sport 6.00 4.66 4.15 0.45 
Have more than $40 cash in your wallet 5.15 3.66 3.36 0.23 
Argue with a friend or family member 2.62 2.62 2.67 - 0.05 
Stay up past midnight 3.46 6.21 6.13 0.08 
Watch at least an hour of television 3.92 3.15 3.67 - 0.51 
Tell a lie 2.77 2.77 3.05 - 0.28 
Pay someone a compliment 5.46 4.97 4.54 0.44 
Average 4.19 3.86 3.60 0.25 
 
These results stand in contrast to those of Study 1, in which the 
valence of the event was unrelated to the past-future asymmetry in 
likelihood judgments.  But these results should not be taken to mean that 
only highly positive events are judged to be more likely in the future than 
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in the past.  Among the items showing the largest past-future difference 
are “wearing red” (Mdiff = 0.72, t(38) = 3.26, p < .005)  and “having a 
phone conversation lasting more than 30 minutes” (Mdiff = 0.64, t(38) = 
1.98, p < .06) both of which seem to be fairly neutral behaviors.  Indeed, 
when I asked a separate sample of 30 participants to classify each of the 
events in this study as positive, negative or neutral, 73% classified 
“wearing red” as neutral, and 70% classified “having a phone 
conversation lasting more than 30 minutes” as neutral.  Thus, it is likely 
that the observed positive correlation between event valence and the past-
future asymmetry is due to a tendency to predict that negative events are 
unlikely to happen, rather than a tendency to predict that only positive 
events are likely to happen, in the future.  The relationship between this 
finding and the findings of Study 1 will be discussed further below. 
One limitation of Study 3 is that although I attempted to equate 
knowledge of the past and future by asking participants about what 
happened on a very specific date in the distant past and future, I cannot 
fully rule out an artifactual explanation of the results.  In particular, it is 
possible that some participants knew that they had never engaged in a 
particular behavior in the past, regardless of specific date, but could not 
say for certain that they would not engage in that behavior in the future.  
These participants would be likely to show a past-future difference not 
because they judge uncertain future events as more likely than uncertain 
past events in general, but because they have specific knowledge of the 
past that does not extend to the future.   
One piece of evidence arguing against this artifactual explanation 
comes from a survey I conducted using a separate sample of respondents    
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(n = 41).  Survey respondents were provided with the list of behaviors 
from Study 3 and were asked to indicate whether or not they had engaged 
in each of the behaviors sometime in the past two years.  I reasoned that if 
most or all of the participants in this follow-up study had engaged in each 
behavior sometime in the past two years, it is unlikely that the results of 
Study 3 were driven by a subset of participants who had not done so.  
Only for three of the 12 behaviors did more than one participant indicate 
that they had not engaged in that behavior sometime in the past two years.  
Moreover, the size of the effect for these three behaviors – eating cereal 
for breakfast, cooking dinner, and feeling lonely – did not differ 
significantly from the size of the effect for the other nine behaviors 
(paired t(38) = 1.33, ns).  Thus, although I cannot rule out the possibility 
that some participants in Study 3 had never engaged in one or more of the 
behaviors at any time in the past, I believe it is unlikely that the results of 
Study 3 can be entirely attributed to this artifactual explanation. 
Conclusion 
 When people gaze into the future, they see a different world than 
when they peer into the past.  In the future people see possibility; they see 
a world where the same event that was unlikely to occur in the past may 
yet occur in the future.  Indeed, across three different studies, participants 
consistently judged uncertain future events to be more likely than 
identical past events, all other things being equal.  In Study 1, participants 
thought a typical Cornell student would be more likely to experience a 
variety of positive and negative events in the coming week than that she 
had experienced those same events in the past week.  In Study 2, 
participants thought it more likely that a mentally ill individual would 
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attempt suicide if they were predicting his future behavior than if they 
were postdicting his past behavior.  This effect occurred regardless of 
whether the prior base rate of suicide attempts for individuals with this 
illness was high or low.  In Study 3, participants thought it more likely 
that they themselves would experience a variety of events on a specific 
date one year into the future than that they had experienced those same 
events on a specific date one year into the past. 
 Interestingly, the role of event valence in moderating this effect 
differed across studies.  In Study 1 the valence of the event was unrelated 
to the past-future asymmetry, whereas in Study 3 the valence of the event 
was positively related to the asymmetry – participants in Study 3 were 
more likely to show the past-future asymmetry to the extent that the event 
they were judging was more positive (or at least less negative).  Why 
might this be the case?  One possibility is that the events in Study 3 were 
more extreme in valence than those of Study 1, and thus there was more 
of an opportunity for valence to play a role in moderating the effect.  I 
believe this is unlikely, as the events in Study 3 are not noticeably more 
extreme than those in Study 1, an observation that is bolstered by a 
comparison of the variance in participants’ mean positivity ratings across 
items in each of the two studies (SDs = 1.44 and 1.31 for Studies 1 and 3, 
respectively).   
A more likely explanation is that participants were more motivated 
to predict a positive future in Study 3, when they were forecasting their 
own fate, than in Study 1, when they were forecasting the fate of someone 
else.  This hypothesis is consistent with a great deal of research on the 
tendency for people to hold overly optimistic beliefs about themselves and 
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their prospects (e.g., Buehler et al., 1994; Epley & Dunning, 2000; 
Newby-Clark & Ross, 2003; Weinstein, 1980).  If people are motivated to 
see their own futures as bright and rosy, they should tend to overestimate 
the likelihood of positive outcomes and to underestimate the likelihood of 
negative outcomes in the future.  In the case of positive events, this would 
lead to an augmentation of the timing effect in likelihood judgments, as 
both the timing effect and the motivation to forecast a positive future 
would lead people to judge positive future events as more likely than 
equivalent past events.  In the case of negative events, however, the 
motivation to forecast a positive future would conflict with the tendency 
to see uncertain events as more likely in the future than in the past, 
leading to a reduction in the timing effect.  Neutral events should be 
unaffected by the motivation to forecast a positive future, and hence 
would show only the usual timing effect in likelihood judgments.  This 
account seems to fit the results of Study 3 quite well.   
If this reasoning is correct, we might expect the timing effect to be 
less reliable when people are predicting self-relevant outcomes than when 
they are predicting outcomes unrelated to the self, as the occurrence of the 
timing effect in self-relevant judgments will depend quite heavily on 
whether one is evaluating positive, negative, or neutral outcomes.  I will 
return to this point in Chapter Five, when I discuss the boundary 
conditions of the timing effect in likelihood judgments.  
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CHAPTER THREE: 
INTO THE GREAT WIDE OPEN 
   Eddie waited ‘til he finished high school 
   He went to Hollywood, got a tattoo 
   He met a girl out there with a tattoo too 
   The future was wide open 
   – Tom Petty, Into the Great Wide Open 
In the last chapter I presented evidence indicating that people judge 
uncertain future events to be more probable than equivalent past events.  
Why might this be the case?  As described in Chapter One, one potential 
explanation is that people associate the future (but not the past) with 
openness and possibility, and thus any particular event seems more 
possible (and hence more probable) in the future than in the past.  
Although casual observation suggests that people associate the future with 
openness more so than the past, this claim has not yet been tested 
empirically.  Before examining whether this association is responsible for 
the timing effect in likelihood judgments, then, it is first necessary to test 
whether people do indeed associate the future with openness and 
possibility more so than the past.   
To do so, I conducted a study in which I measured people’s 
associations to past and future using both explicit and implicit measures.  
The explicit measure was a semantic differential scale in which 
participants rated the concepts of past and future on a series of bipolar 
attributes related to the concepts of openness and possibility on the one 
hand, versus determinism and fixedness on the other.  The implicit 
measure was an adaptation of the Implicit Association Test (IAT; 
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Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998), which has been used to measure 
a variety of implicit attitudes and beliefs, including intergroup bias, self-
esteem, and consumer attitudes, just to name a few (Dasgupta & 
Greenwald, 2001; Greenwald & Farnam, 2000; Maison, Greenwald & 
Bruin, 2001).  In my version of the IAT, participants classified words as 
belonging to the categories of past versus future and open versus closed.  I 
predicted that an implicit association between the future and the concept 
of openness would be revealed by a tendency to respond more quickly 
when future was paired with open (and past with closed) in the 
classification task than when future was paired with closed (and past with 
open).   
Study 4a:  The Past-Future Semantic Differential 
Method 
Fifty-five Cornell undergraduates completed the present study, 
which was distributed in a packet of unrelated surveys being collected by 
various researchers in the Social Psychology laboratory.  Participants 
were asked to rate the concepts past and future on four 7-point semantic 
differential scales related to the concepts of openness and possibility 
(open-closed, certain-uncertain, fixed-malleable, determined-
undetermined).  To explore whether people also see the future in more 
positive terms than the past, I included two semantic differential scales 
related to the concept of positivity (positive-negative, dim-bright).  These 
two sets of ratings were embedded within several filler items asking 
participants to rate other concepts unrelated to time on bipolar scales 
relevant to those objects (e.g., honest-corrupt and for the concept 
politicians, or important-unimportant for the concept education).  The 
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order of the two key concepts was counterbalanced, such that some 
participants first rated future and later rated past, whereas others rated 
them in the opposite order. 
Results and Discussion 
Participants’ average ratings of past and future are displayed in 
Table 3.1.  As predicted, participants rated the future as more open to 
possibility than the past on every one of the six measures.  Specifically, in 
comparison to the past, participants judged the future to be significantly 
more open, uncertain, malleable, undetermined, positive, and bright (see 
Table 3.1 for the results of significance tests on these differences).  The 
order of participants’ judgments did not moderate these differences in 
ratings of past versus future.4  Thus, on an explicit level, participants 
reported seeing the future as relatively open and positive, and the past as 
relatively closed and negative. 
It is interesting to note that the size of the past-future difference is 
much larger for the items related to openness (open, uncertain, malleable, 
and undetermined) than for the items related to positivity (positive and 
bright).  Indeed, an analysis comparing the mean past-future difference 
across the four openness items to the mean past-future difference across 
the two positivity items revealed a significant difference, Ms = 3.7 and 
                                                
4 Although not central to my investigation, I conducted a factor analysis to examine 
how participants’ ratings on these dimensions hung together when they judged the past 
and future.  A principal components analysis with varimax rotation on the six ratings 
of the past yielded two factors.  Factor 1 included open-closed, determined-
undetermined, certain-uncertain and malleable-fixed whereas Factor 2 included 
positive-negative and bright-dim.  The same analysis on the six ratings of the future 
also yielded two, albeit somewhat different, factors.  Factor 1 included open-closed, 
positive-negative, and bright-dim whereas Factor 2 included determined-
undetermined, certain-uncertain and malleable-fixed. 
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0.9, SDs = 1.4 and 1.4 for openness and positivity, respectively, paired 
t(54) = 11.52, p < .0005.   The future is much more open, uncertain, 
malleable, and undetermined than the past, but only a little brighter and a 
little more positive.  Thus, it appears that the concept of openness is much 
more central to the distinction between past and future than is the concept 
of positivity. 
 
Table 3.1 
Mean ratings of past and future along six dimensions 
Item Future Past Difference Paired t-statistic 
Open 6.15 2.53 3.62 16.61** 
Uncertain 5.84 1.93 3.91 18.23** 
Malleable 5.89 1.82 4.07 17.35** 
Undetermined 4.96 1.96 3.00 11.23** 
Positive 5.56 4.91 0.65 3.31* 
Bright 5.58 4.47 1.11 4.70** 
Note.  After Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons, t-statistics marked with a 
single asterisk (*) are significant at the p < .05 level; those marked with a double 
asterisk (**) are significant at the p < .005 level. 
 
Study 4b:  The Past-Future IAT 
Method 
Participants were 53 members of two Cornell sororities who 
participated in this and several other short studies for a cash payment.  
The present study was run by two research assistants (each a member of 
one of the sororities), who set up a Dell Inspiron Notebook running 
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Millisecond Inquisit software in a quiet spot in the sorority house, and 
recruited participants from the house to participate in the study. 
The Past-Future IAT was designed using the guidelines set forth by 
Greenwald, Nosek and Banaji (2003).  The IAT consisted of seven blocks 
of trials, with 20 trials in each of the five practice blocks and 40 trials in 
each of the two critical test blocks (see Table 3.2 for an overview of the 
IAT procedure).  In each block, the words to be classified appeared one at 
a time in the center of the screen. Category labels were displayed for the 
duration of the block on the upper left- and right-hand corners of the 
screen.  Participants were asked to classify the words by pressing a key on 
the left- or right-hand side of the keyboard to indicate whether the target 
word belonged in the category on the left or the category on the right.   
 Brief instructions were provided immediately before each block, 
and participants were provided with the list of words that belonged to 
each category at the beginning of the test.  The Future words were future, 
tomorrow, and will be; The Past words were past, yesterday, and was; The 
Open words were open, yes, and possible; The Closed words were closed, 
no, and limited.  Participants were asked classify these words as quickly 
as possible into the appropriate category without compromising accuracy.  
If a participant made a mistake (i.e., put a word into the wrong category), 
a red X appeared below the target word and the participant had to make 
the correct response to proceed. 
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Table 3.2 
Design of the Past-Future IAT 
Block Trials Function Left-key  Right-key  
1 20 Practice Future words Past words 
2 20 Practice Open words Closed words 
3 20 Practice Future or Open Past or Closed 
4 40 Test Future or Open Past or Closed 
5 20 Practice Past words Future words 
6 20 Practice Past or Open Future or Closed 
7 40 Test Past or Open Future or Closed 
Note.  The order of the pairings was counterbalanced across participants such that for 
some participants Future was paired with Open and Past with Closed on Blocks 3 and 
4, but for other participants Future was paired with Closed and Past with Open on 
these blocks. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 The IAT data were analyzed by computing the D1 measure 
described by Greenwald et al. (2003), which equaled the mean difference 
in latency on trials for which Future was paired with Closed (and Past 
with Open) and those for which Future was paired with Open (and Past 
with Closed), divided by the overall standard deviation of these latencies.  
Positive numbers indicated a tendency to response more quickly when 
Future was paired with Open and Past with Closed than vice versa.  Trials 
with response latencies greater than 10,000 ms were discarded, whereas 
those under 10,000 ms were included (even if errors were made).  
Latencies for both practice blocks (3 and 6) and test blocks (4 and 7) are 
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included in this measure.  D1 has been shown to outperform the original 
IAT scoring procedure on a variety of metrics, including the magnitude of 
implicit-explicit correlations, sensitivity to known effects (such as ingroup 
bias), and resistance to the influence of prior experience with the IAT 
(Greenwald et al., 2003). 
A one-sample t-test comparing the mean of participants’ D1 scores 
to zero revealed a significant IAT effect in the predicted direction, M = 
0.59, t(52) = 10.71, p < .0005.  Participants were quicker to respond on 
trials in which Future was paired with Open and Past with Closed (M = 
812 ms, SD = 195 ms) than on trials in which Future was paired with 
Closed and Past with Open (M = 1055 ms, SD = 251 ms).  This suggests 
that people associate the future with openness (and the past with 
fixedness) more strongly than they associate the past with openness (and 
the future with fixedness).  There was also a marginally significant effect 
of order, such that participants for whom Future was first paired with 
Open (and Past with Closed) showed a larger IAT effect than those for 
whom Future was first paired with Closed (and Past with Open), MD1s = 
0.68 and 0.49, SDs = 0.39 and 0.40, respectively, t(51) = 1.76, p < .10.  
This order effect is similar to those that have been documented in prior 
research using the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998). 
These initial findings suggest that people do indeed associate the 
future with openness and possibility more so than the past, both at an 
implicit and at an explicit level.  Thus, the association between the future 
and openness is a potential explanation for the tendency to believe 
uncertain future events are more probable than equivalent past events.  
This is not the only potential explanation, however.  Another possibility is 
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that people feel more accountable to the past than to the future, and thus 
are less likely to engage in a simple, confirmation-based strategy when 
judging past events than when judging future ones (Tetlock, 1992). That 
is, because past events are typically known or knowable, whereas future 
ones are not (yet), people may feel more pressure to make careful, 
accurate judgments about past events. When considering future events, on 
the other hand, people may be more likely to approach the judgment task 
in a more casual manner and engage in a confirmation-based approach 
typical of everyday hypothesis testing (Klayman & Ha, 1987; Snyder & 
Swann, 1978).   
This accountability explanation seems unlikely, as it is not clear 
why feeling less accountable to the future should always lead to increases 
in the perceived likelihood of future events.  Indeed, confirmatory 
thinking biases hypothesis testing toward confirming whatever hypothesis 
one is initially considering.  In cases where the initial hypothesis is that an 
event is likely to occur, confirmatory thinking should lead to the 
perception that the event is even more likely to occur.  But in cases where 
the initial hypothesis is that an event is unlikely to occur, confirmatory 
thinking should lead to the perception that the event is even less likely to 
occur.  Not only is this prediction at odds with the overall findings of my 
first three studies, in which a wide variety of events were perceived to be 
more likely in the future than in the past, it is especially inconsistent with 
the results of Study 2, in which the focal event was judged to be more 
likely in the future than in the past even when the base rate of that event 
was low.  If people are more likely to confirm their initial hypothesis 
when predicting the future than when postdicting the past, this should 
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have led participants to judge the low base rate event to be less, not more, 
likely in the future.   
Study 5:  Priming the Future 
It seems unlikely, then, that the results of Studies 1-3 are due to a 
tendency toward greater accountability and hence more deliberative 
thought when judging past events than when judging future events.  But 
because this idea remains intuitively compelling (in some ways one 
should feel more accountable to the past than to the future), I designed a 
study to more carefully examine the accountability hypothesis.  In this 
study, temporal information was not explicitly presented to participants, 
but was instead primed outside of conscious awareness.  The 
accountability hypothesis requires that people explicitly consider the 
timing (i.e., past or future) of the event while evaluating information 
relevant to the likelihood of that event.  If participants provide higher 
likelihood estimates when they are merely primed with the concept of 
future, despite having no knowledge of the temporal information and 
while engaging in a task that requires rapid responding, this would 
suggest that the past-future asymmetry is due not to greater deliberation 
when considering past events, but rather to the associations that spring to 
mind when the concepts of past and future are activated. 
 Thus, in Study 5 participants were led to believe that the purpose of 
the study was to see how easily people can detect subliminal stimuli.  For 
this reason, they were told, they would be subliminally primed with a 
particular geometrical shape, and would rate the likelihood that a 
subsequently presented (supraliminal) target shape was the same as the 
shape that had been subliminally flashed at them moments before.  In 
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actuality, participants were subliminally presented not with geometrical 
shapes, but with words intended to prime the concepts of past, present or 
future.  The “subliminal perception” cover story was intended to: (a) 
provide an explanation for the brief flashes participants would see on-
screen, and (b) give the participants a context in which to make a series of 
likelihood judgments.  If the timing effect in likelihood judgments is due 
to explicit feelings of accountability to the past, I should find no 
difference in participants’ likelihood judgments between future prime 
trials and past prime trials.  If, as I predict, the timing effect is due to the 
tendency to associate the future with openness and possibility, I should 
find that participants provide higher likelihood estimates when they are 
primed with future than when they are primed with past. 
Moreover, I included a prime intended to activate the concept of 
“present” in order to examine whether the past-future asymmetry arises 
from a tendency to see future events as especially likely or a tendency to 
see past events as especially unlikely.  I argue that people associate the 
future with openness and possibility, and it is this association that drives 
the past-future asymmetry.  Thus, I predict that participants will provide 
higher likelihood estimates on future-prime trials than on past-prime or 
present-prime trials.  I predict that these latter two types of trials will not 
differ from one another, as both the past and the present are already 
determined in a way the future is not. 
Method 
Participants were 36 Cornell undergraduates who participated in 
several short studies for extra credit in a psychology course.  Upon arrival 
at the Social Psychology laboratory, participants were told that they 
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would be completing a computerized “subliminal perception” task.  They 
were told that on each trial, they would be subliminally presented with 
one of three shapes: a triangle, a circle, or a square.  A target shape (also a 
triangle, circle or square) would then appear in the center of the screen.  
Their task was to indicate whether they thought the target shape was the 
same as the shape that was subliminally presented to them a moment 
before by pressing a number between 1 and 9, where 1 meant “not at all 
likely” and 9 meant “extremely likely.”  Participants were further told that 
although the task may seem difficult, they would do fine if they went 
quickly, relying on their initial, gut feeling on each trial. 
Participants then began the task, which consisted of nine practice 
trials and 72 critical trials.  On each critical trial, participants focused their 
attention on a string of nonsense letters (MZNBVZXCVB) in the center 
of the computer screen.  After 300 ms, this fixation point was replaced by 
the prime word (“past,” “future,” or “now”).5  The prime remained on 
screen for 33 ms, and was then masked by the same nonsense letter string 
for an additional 50 ms.  The target shape then appeared in the center of 
the screen, and remained on screen until participants entered a likelihood 
estimate.  The nine practice trials were identical to the critical trials, 
except instead of a prime word, the fixation point was replaced for 33 ms 
by a different string of nonsense letters (ZXCVBNMZXC).  Each of the 
three primes was presented on 24 separate trials, for a total of 72 critical 
trials.  Each prime was paired an equal number of times with the three 
target shapes (square, circle, and triangle), resulting in nine prime-target 
                                                
5 The prime “now” was selected instead of “present” because the word present has 
more than one meaning and might not be interpreted in the manner intended here. 
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pairs that were each presented eight times over the course of the task.  
Trials were randomized for each participant. 
Following the task, participants were probed for awareness of the 
primes using a funnel debriefing procedure (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000).  
No participant reported seeing words (and indeed, quite a few reported 
seeing contours or outlines of shapes) during the subliminal presentations, 
and thus the data from all 36 participants are included in the analyses. 
Results and Discussion 
I tested my hypothesis, that likelihood ratings would be greater 
following “future” primes than following “past” or “now” primes (and 
that ratings for these latter two primes would not differ from one another), 
by averaging participants’ likelihood ratings for targets following each 
type of prime (past, future, now) to create three composite measures of 
likelihood.  A repeated measures ANOVA using the contrast weights 2,    
-1, -1 for future, past, and now, respectively, revealed a significant 
contrast, F(1, 35) = 4.99, p < .05.  As predicted, participants provided 
higher likelihood estimates when primed with the word future (M = 5.41, 
SD = 1.19) than when primed with the words past (M = 5.23, SD = 1.08) 
or now (M = 5.19, SD = 1.07).  The results of the contrast were confirmed 
by simple effects tests, which indicated that likelihood estimates 
following the future prime were significantly greater than those following 
the now prime, paired t(35) = 2.26, p < .05.  The difference between the 
future prime and the past prime, while in the predicted direction, did not 
quite achieve statistical significance, paired t(35) = 1.60, p = .12.   Finally, 
estimates following the past prime and the now prime were not 
significantly different from one another, paired t(35) < 1, ns. 
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These results have several important implications.  First, they more 
fully rule out the hypothesis that the timing effect in likelihood judgments 
is due to greater accountability, and hence more careful deliberation, 
when contemplating the past than when contemplating the future, as the 
effect obtains even when the concepts of past and future are merely 
primed, and are not explicitly linked to the judgment task.  Second, they 
suggest that the asymmetry is driven by a tendency to see future events as 
especially likely, and not a tendency to see past events as especially 
unlikely, relative to the present.  Third, they support the hypothesis that 
the past-future asymmetry is driven by an associative process, in which 
activating the concept of future further activates associated concepts, such 
as those of “openness” and “possibility.” 
Study 6:  Manipulating the Future 
Study 5 provided indirect support for the claim that people judge 
future events to be more likely than past events because they associate the 
future with openness and possibility.  In order to obtain more direct 
evidence for this hypothesis, I conducted a study in which I actively 
manipulated participants’ beliefs about the future.  If people judge future 
events to be more likely than equivalent past events because they see the 
future as more open than the past, then convincing participants that the 
future is not open, but rather is already entirely determined, should 
eliminate the past-future difference in likelihood judgments.  Thus, in 
Study 6, I presented participants with a fake newspaper article, ostensibly 
printed in The New York Times, describing scientists’ current views of the 
nature of time.  Some participants received an article arguing that the 
future is “wide open,” whereas others received an article arguing that the 
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future is “a closed book.”  Participants then made a series of judgments 
about the likelihood of past or future events.  I predicted that participants 
who read that the future is open would show the usual tendency to see 
future events as more likely than equivalent past events, but that this 
effect would be eliminated among those who read that the future is a 
closed book.  If obtained, these results would provide direct evidence that 
the timing effect is due to a tendency to believe in an open future. 
Method 
Participants were 62 Cornell undergraduates (51 female) who 
participated in a set of short, unrelated studies in exchange for extra credit 
in their psychology course.  The present study occupied the last spot in the 
experimental session.  Participants were asked to complete a packet of 
materials described as a set of unrelated questionnaires.  In actuality, this 
packet contained the manipulation of participants’ associations to the 
future, the likelihood judgment task, manipulation checks, and several 
filler questionnaires meant to disguise the connection between the 
different components of the study. 
The manipulation of participants’ associations to the future 
appeared first in the packet, and consisted of a fake newspaper article 
describing the implications of recent scientific discoveries for the way in 
which scientists think about time.  Participants were asked to simply read 
the article, as they would be asked some questions about it later in the 
packet.  Two versions of this article were created – one that described the 
future as “wide open,” and another that described the future as “a closed 
book.”  More specifically, the Open Future article argued that given the 
sheer number of factors that influence any given event, it is virtually 
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impossible to know for sure what the future will bring.  The Closed 
Future article, on the other hand, argued that because the universe 
operates according to the principle of cause and effect, the future is 
already determined by the events of the past and present (see Appendix 
for the full text of the articles).  Thus, participants reading the former 
article were primed with the concept of an open future, whereas those 
reading the latter were primed with the concept of a closed, or 
predetermined, future. 
After reading the article, participants moved on to a filler 
questionnaire, followed by the main dependent measure, a modified 
version of the “Everyday Events” questionnaire used in Study 1.  The 
questionnaire was identical to that used in Study 1 except the problematic 
“hiking” item was eliminated (see Footnote 2).  Thus, participants were 
asked to judge the likelihood that Jen either had experienced each of 11 
events in the past week, or would experience each those same 11 events in 
the coming week.  As in Study 1, participants made these judgments on 7-
point scales anchored at 1 (“extremely unlikely”) and 7 (“extremely 
likely”).  After completing these measures, participants moved on to the 
next page in the packet, which asked them some questions about the 
article they read.  This set of questions contained a manipulation check, in 
which participants were asked to indicate which of two statements best 
described the article they read.  These statements were: “The future is 
wide open” and “The future is a closed book.”6  The manipulation check 
                                                
6 All but two participants correctly chose the statement that best described the article 
they had read.  Because the responses of these two participants did not differ from 
those of participants who correctly identified the topic of the article, and because it 
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was followed by several filler items asking participants to rate how 
interesting and well written the article was, which in turn were followed 
by two items asking participants to report their own beliefs about the 
future.  Specifically, participants were asked to rate their agreement with 
the following: “Anything can happen in the future” and “The future is 
constrained by the past and present.”  These ratings were made on 7-point 
scales anchored at 1 (“totally disagree”) and 7 (“totally agree”). 
Results and Discussion  
As in Study 1, ratings for each event were normalized and the 
resulting z-scores were averaged to form a composite measure of 
likelihood.  A 2 (article: open future vs. closed future) x 2 (timing: past 
vs. future) ANOVA on this composite revealed a significant interaction 
between the content of the article and the timing of participants’ 
judgments, F(1, 58) = 4.49, p < .05.  This interaction is displayed in 
Figure 3.1. 
Follow-up comparisons using the error term from the ANOVA 
revealed that participants who read that the future is wide open showed 
the usual tendency to judge future events as more likely than equivalent 
past events, Mfuture = .11, SDfuture = .23; Mpast = -.13, SDpast = .51; t(58) = 
1.82, p = .07.  Participants who read that the future is a closed book, on 
the other hand, did not judge future events to be more likely than 
equivalent past events.  If anything, these participants appear to judge 
future events to be less likely than past events, although this difference is 
not significant, Mfuture = -.10, SDfuture = .35; Mpast = .05, SDpast = .37; t(58) = 
                                                                                                                                       
seems more likely that these participants misread the manipulation check than that 
they misread the article, their responses were retained for the sake of power. 
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1.17, ns.  Looking at the data another way, participants who read that the 
future is open judged future events to be more likely than participants who 
read that the future is determined, t(58) = 1.72, p = .09.  The content of 
the article did not affect participants’ judgments of the past, t(58) = 1.24, 
ns.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 
Mean likelihood judgment as a function of the timing of the events and 
article manipulation. 
 
Was the effect of the article manipulation on the timing effect in 
likelihood judgments mediated by a change in participants’ explicit 
beliefs about the openness of the future?  The two items tapping 
participants’ own beliefs about the future were not highly related (α = .54) 
and thus are analyzed separately.  Participants who read that the future is 
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open were marginally more likely than those who read that the future is 
closed to agree with the statement, “Anything can happen in the future” 
(Mopen = 5.7, SDopen = 1.1; Mclosed = 5.2, SDclosed = 1.5; t(60) = 1.68, p < .10).  
Contrary to expectations, however, participants who read that the future is 
open were as likely as those who read that the future is closed to agree 
with the statement, “The future is constrained by the past and present” 
(Mopen = 4.0, SDopen = 1.5; Mclosed = 3.8, SDclosed = 1.6; t(60) < 1, ns). 
Even though the effect of the article manipulation on participants’ 
belief that “anything can happen in the future” was only marginally 
significant, I conducted a mediational analysis to examine whether the 
change in this belief might mediate the effect of the article manipulation 
on the tendency to see future events as more likely than equivalent past 
events.  The data did not meet the requirements for mediational analysis, 
however, in that the proposed mediator (a belief that anything can happen 
in the future) did not interact with the timing manipulation to significantly 
predict the dependent measure (likelihood estimates), β = .092, t(58) = 
1.25, ns.  Thus, while the change in this belief parallels the change in the 
past-future asymmetry, the former does not mediate the latter. 
The results of Study 5 support the argument that the belief in an 
open future is causally related to the timing effect in likelihood 
judgments, as priming participants with the concept of a “closed” rather 
than an “open” future completely eliminated the past-future asymmetry.  
Interestingly, participants’ explicit beliefs about the extent to which the 
future is open versus closed did not mediate this change in likelihood 
judgments for past and future events.  It is possible that the self-report 
items I used were not sensitive enough to pick up on the changes in 
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participants’ associations to the future induced by the article 
manipulation.  It is also possible, however, that the article changed 
participants’ associations at a more implicit level, such that they could not 
accurately report on this change.  Either way, simply having participants 
read an article arguing that the future is a closed book eliminated the 
tendency to judge future events as more likely than past events, 
suggesting that this phenomenon arises from an association between the 
future and openness or possibility. 
Conclusion 
 Like Eddie in Tom Petty’s now-classic ode to youth and rebellion, 
many people see the future as wide open.  They also see it as 
undetermined, malleable, uncertain, positive and bright, at least in 
comparison to the past.  Because people associate the future with 
openness and possibility more so than the past, they tend to see any 
particular uncertain event as bit more possible, and hence a bit more 
probable, in the future than in the past.  Indeed, these associations seem to 
be so strong that incidental reminders of the future, even those that people 
encounter subliminally, are enough to prompt people to judge uncertain 
events in the world around them to be more likely.  Might these 
associations to the future lead to other consequences beyond the realm of 
likelihood judgments?  It is this question that I turn to in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
BEYOND LIKELIHOOD 
 In Chapter Three, I presented data suggesting that people see the 
future very differently from the way they see the past.  The future tends to 
be seen as open, malleable, uncertain and undetermined, whereas the past 
tends to be seen as closed, fixed, certain and determined.  Moreover, the 
future is relatively more positive and bright, whereas the past is relatively 
more negative and dim.  Do these associations to past and future have 
consequences beyond the domain of likelihood judgment? 
In this chapter I report the results of two studies exploring this 
question.  In the first, I examined whether participants estimating the 
percentage of their peers endorsing a particular belief would provide 
higher estimates if they were predicting future beliefs than if they were 
postdicting past beliefs.  If people see the future as more open than the 
past, this should have implications not just for likelihood estimates, but 
for any type of judgment that requires an assessment of what is possible. 
Thus, I asked participants in Study 7 to estimate the percentage of 
respondents who, in an opinion survey, would agree with one of two 
complementary attitudinal statements.  If people make such a judgment by 
asking themselves, “Would people agree with this?” they should be 
predisposed to answer “Yes” and thus provide higher estimates if they are 
predicting future agreement than if they are postdicting past agreement.  
By including two complementary attitudinal statements, this study also 
allowed me to examined whether the tendency to give higher estimates to 
future events than to past events can lead people to believe, paradoxically, 
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that two complementary focal events are both more possible in the future 
than in the past.  
Study 7: Estimating the Beliefs of Others 
Method 
Sixty volunteers were recruited at public locations on the Cornell 
campus and asked to complete a short questionnaire.  Participants were 
presented with one of two attitude statements regarding capital 
punishment and asked to indicate, in a forced choice format, whether they 
agreed or disagreed with the statement.  Half of the participants were 
presented with an anti-capital punishment statement (“I believe the death 
penalty should be abolished in the U.S.”); the other half were presented 
with a pro-capital punishment statement (“I believe the death penalty 
should continue to be used as a form of punishment in the U.S.”).  After 
indicating whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement, 
participants were asked to estimate the percentage of respondents in a 
Psychology department survey who would agree with the statement.  Half 
of the participants were asked to suppose that the survey would take place 
the following month whereas the other half were asked to suppose that the 
survey took place the previous month. 
Results and Discussion 
Participants tended to oppose capital punishment, as 63.3% of those 
presented with the anti-capital punishment statement agreed with it, 
whereas only 40% of those presented with the pro-capital punishment 
statement did so.  This difference was marginally significant, χ2 = 3.27, p 
< .10.  Participants’ estimates of their peers’ attitudes were analyzed via a 
2 (statement: pro vs. con) x 2 (self: agree vs. disagree) x 2 (timing: past 
 49 
vs. future) ANOVA.  This analysis revealed the predicted main effect of 
timing, F(1, 52) = 13.57, p < .001.  Participants estimated that a higher 
percentage of their peers would agree with the statement if the survey had 
yet to take place (M = 61.5%, SD  = 15.9%) than if it had already taken 
place (M = 44.1%, SD = 16.8%), regardless of which statement 
participants were evaluating.  No other effects approached significance.  
Thus, participants thought that a greater percentage of their peers would 
be pro-capital punishment, and that a greater percentage would be anti-
capital punishment, if they were predicting future responses than if they 
were postdicting past responses (See Figure 4.1).7 
                                                
7 Some readers may be surprised to learn that I did not find evidence of a false 
consensus effect in the data, whereby those who favored capital punishment would 
expect others to be relatively more pro-capital punishment than would those who 
opposed capital punishment (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). I believe the lack of a 
false consensus effect can be traced to the particular method used to elicit participants’ 
responses. I asked participants to indicate their own opinions immediately before 
estimating the opinions of others, which may have drawn their attention to the possible 
influence of this factor on their estimates and led them to discount it. Indeed, several 
researchers have noted that false consensus effects are greatly attenuated when 
participants’ own choices are elicited before, not after, their predictions about the 
choices of others (Fabrigar & Krosnick, 1995; Mullen et al., 1985). 
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Figure 4.1 
Mean estimates of the percentage of Cornell students who would agree 
with each statement, by timing condition. 
 
 These results are interesting for two reasons.  First, they extend the 
timing effect beyond likelihood estimates to other types of judgments.  
Second, they provide the first evidence that the timing effect may be 
considered a bias.  The statements participants evaluated were entirely 
complementary, so to the extent that they believed more people would 
agree with one statement in the future, they should have believed that 
fewer people would agree with the other statement.  If a greater 
percentage of the population will be pro-capital punishment in the future, 
for example, then a smaller percentage of the population will be anti-
capital punishment.  Instead, participants estimated that more people 
would agree with each statement in the future – that a greater percentage 
would be pro-capital punishment and a greater percentage would be anti-
 51 
capital punishment.  In this way, the tendency to believe in an open future 
appears to introduce a bias into people’s judgments. 
Study 8:  Representing Time 
 The results of Study 7 suggest that the tendency to see the future as 
more open than the past has consequences for judgments beyond the 
domain of likelihood.  But this is not the only association to the future that 
might have consequences for judgments and behavior.  In addition to 
reporting that the future is more open than the past, people also report that 
the future is relatively bright and positive whereas the past is relatively 
dim and negative.  If people do in fact hold these associations to past and 
future, we should be able to see traces of these associations in the way 
people depict the passage of time.  That is, when people pictorially depict 
the distant past, they should depict it as a relatively dark place, whereas 
they should depict the more recent past, the present, and the future as 
increasingly brighter.   
One way to test this hypothesis is to examine how people represent 
the passage of time in timelines.  Historical and geological timelines often 
use color to enhance the look of the timeline and aid in interpretation by 
showing gradients of color from one end of the timeline to the other.  
When people use varying shades of color to depict the passage of time in 
timelines, do they naturally tend to use darker colors to represent the 
distant past and increasingly lighter colors to represent the more recent 
past, the present, and the future?  In order to answer this question, I 
conducted a two-part study.  Study 8a was an archival study of color 
timelines available on the Internet that were coded for the gradient of 
color used to represent the transition from past to present and/or present to 
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future.  If people do indeed associate the past with darkness and the future 
with brightness, I should find that more of these timelines use color 
gradients that progress from relatively dark to relatively light colors than 
progress from relatively light to relatively dark ones.  Study 8b was a 
behavioral study in which participants were asked to color in a blank 
timeline using four colored pencils of varying shades of green.  Again, if 
people associate the past with darkness and the future with brightness, I 
should find that participants start with the darkest shade of green to 
illustrate the distant past, and use increasingly lighter shades to illustrate 
the progression of time across the timeline. 
Study 8a:  Archival Timeline Study 
Method 
The following keywords were entered, one at a time, into the image 
search function of a popular Internet search engine: “timeline,” 
“timelines,” “timeline of history,” “timelines of history,” “historical 
timeline,” “geological time chart,” “geological timeline,” “timelines of 
world history,” “evolution chart,” “evolution timeline,” and “geological 
time scale.” 8  Only the first 100 image results per search were considered 
(for a total of 1100 images).  Of these, images of timelines displaying 
progressively lighter or darker coloration in either direction (light to dark 
or dark to light) were selected for inclusion in the study.  A research 
assistant coded each timeline for whether the color gradient became 
progressively lighter or darker as time progressed from the distant past to 
the present and/or future, and a second rater verified the direction of the 
color change.  In order for a timeline to be coded as progressing from 
                                                
8 This search engine can be accessed at http://images.google.com. 
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light to dark (or vice versa), it had to show a consistent change from 
lighter to darker shades of color (either the same color or different colors 
that varied in lightness).  Images containing ambiguous color gradients 
that did not clearly progress from dark to light or light to dark were 
excluded from analysis. 
Results 
Thirty-eight timelines were identified that showed a clear transition 
from lighter to darker shades of color or from darker to lighter shades of 
color.  This sample included historical and geological timelines that 
represented the distant past up to the present, as well as religious and 
technological timelines that began in the recent past or present and 
transitioned to predictions about the future.  Of the 38 timelines identified, 
27 (71.1%) were consistent with the hypothesis that the colors used would 
become progressively lighter as the timeline approached modern day 
(and/or progressed into the future), whereas 11 (28.9%) were inconsistent 
with this hypothesis in that the colors used became progressively darker 
as the timeline approached the present (and/or continued into the future).9  
This pattern of results deviated significantly from chance, χ2 = 6.74, p < 
.01.   
Study 8b:  Behavioral Timeline Study 
The results of Study 8a suggest that people tend to naturally 
represent the progression of time as one that begins in darkness and gets 
brighter as it advances, and is consistent with the idea that people see the 
                                                
9 Of the 27 timelines progressing from dark to light, 23 depicted past events and 4 depicted past through 
future events.  Of the 11 timelines progressing from light to dark, 8 depicted past events, 2 depicted past 
through future events, and 1 did not depict a particular time period (instead this timeline showed the life 
course of a particular species of fish).   
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past as relatively dark or dim, and the future as relatively bright.  It is 
possible, however, that the timelines published on Internet websites are 
not representative of the way people are normally inclined to represent 
time.  Thus a second set of data was collected from a group of participants 
who were asked to color in a blank timeline.  Again, if people are 
naturally inclined to see the progression of time as one from the darkness 
of the past to the brightness of the future, these participants should select 
darker colors for the earlier portion of the timeline and lighter colors for 
the later portion. 
Method 
 Twenty volunteers were recruited at various locations in Ithaca, 
NY and were asked to complete a short questionnaire.  Those agreeing 
to participate were given a black-and-white copy of a geological 
timeline, and were asked to color in the timeline using a set of four 
green colored pencils that varied in shade.  Specifically, participants 
were told: 
This is a geological timeline representing the last 250 million 
years on Earth, which included the rise and fall of the dinosaurs 
and the evolution of humans.  Timelines like this one are often 
presented in color, and as you can see right now this one is just 
black and white.  What I would like you to do is to give the 
timeline a splash of color.  So please use these pencils to color in 
the timeline however you would like, as though you were 
preparing to use it in a presentation. 
The four colored pencils participants were given varied in shade such that 
they included a very light green, a moderately light green, a moderately 
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dark green, and a very dark green.  The timeline consisted of a white box 
with a black border divided into four main segments (see Figure 4.2).  The 
segments were labeled with the appropriate periods of the Mesozoic era 
(Triassic, Jurassic, Cretaceous) and the fourth segment was simply labeled 
as the Cenozoic era.  Several arrows pointed to different areas of the 
timeline and were labeled with major events that occurred at that time 
(such as the rise of the dinosaurs and the evolution of humans). 
 
 
Figure 4.2 
Timeline that participants were asked to illustrate with color in Study 8b. 
 
Results and Discussion 
  Eight of the 20 participants colored in the timeline in a way that 
did not consistently progress from light to dark or from dark to light, and 
are excluded from the analysis.  Of the 12 participants who did show a 
consistent progression of shading, 10 (83.3%) colored in the timeline in 
the predicted direction, starting with the darkest shade of green for the 
earliest era, and using progressively lighter shades of green to decorate the 
remaining eras.  The remaining two participants (16.7%) colored in the 
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timeline in the opposite direction, starting with the lightest shade of green 
and using progressively darker shades to show more recent time periods.  
This pattern deviates significantly from chance according to a binomial 
test, p < .05.  Thus, a significant majority of the participants who depicted 
the passage of time using a consistent color gradient did so by progressing 
from relative darkness to relative lightness.  This is again consistent with 
the idea that people associate the past with darkness and the present 
and/or future with brightness. 
Conclusion 
 The results of two studies suggest that the tendency for people to 
see the past and future in very different ways extends beyond the realm of 
likelihood judgments.  Participants asked to estimate the percentage of 
their peers endorsing a particular attitude statement thought that more of 
their peers would endorse the statement in the future than in the past, 
regardless of the actual content of the statement.  This suggests that the 
tendency to see the future as open might have implications for a wide 
variety of judgments and behaviors.  Indeed, people may simply see 
everything as bigger in the future than in the past.  That is, to the extent 
that the future is seen as open and expansive, it may loom larger in the 
mind than the past, and hence future events may simply seem bigger than 
past events.  If this were true, we might expect that participants asked to 
estimate a variety of sums or quantities would provide larger estimates for 
future events than for past events.  This is a possibility worthy of future 
research. 
 An additional study examined whether the tendency to see the past 
as relatively dark and the future as relatively bright would have 
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implications for the way people depict the passage of time.  An archival 
analysis and a behavioral study both showed that when people use color 
gradient in historical and geological timelines to illustrate the passage of 
time, they tend to favor gradients that progress from dark to light over 
those that progress from light to dark.  This suggests that people tend to 
think about time as a journey from the darkness of the past to the 
brightness of the future.  This conclusion should be considered tentative, 
however, as the majority of the timelines in Study 8a focused on the past 
through the present, as did the timeline participants were asked to 
illustrate in Study 8b.  Thus, it may be more appropriate to conclude that 
people see the past as darker than the present than to conclude that people 
see the future as brighter than the past.  Although the subset of timelines 
that depicted future events in Study 8a agreed with the overall pattern of 
results, a larger sample of future-oriented timelines should be examined 
before making any strong conclusions about the way in which people 
depict the future.  Moreover, the procedure used to select timelines in 
Study 8a did not allow for the inclusion of timelines that depicted the 
present as brighter than both the past and the future.  Although a cursory 
inspection of the original search results suggests that such timelines 
appear rarely if at all, this possibility should be examined more carefully 
in future research.   
These caveats aside, it would be interesting to explore whether the 
tendency to see the past as relatively dark and the future as relatively 
bright might appear in artists’ depictions of past and future events, or in 
people’s own imaginations.  When people mentally visualize future 
events, do they literally “see” a brighter image than when they visualize 
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past events?  These are just a few of the possible extensions of this work 
into domains beyond that of likelihood judgments.  Given the sheer 
number of associations people have to past and future, we might expect to 
find that the temporal contexts of events have a wide variety of influences 
on how people perceive those events.  Some of these potential influences 
will be discussed in the next chapter, when I consider future directions for 
this work.
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 I began this dissertation with a question: What do people see when 
they gaze into the future?  The research documented here suggests that 
they see a world open to possibility.  And because people associate the 
future with openness and possibility, they tend to see uncertain future 
events as more likely to occur than equivalent past events, all else being 
equal.  In Chapter Two, I documented this temporal asymmetry in 
likelihood judgments.  In three studies, participants judged uncertain 
future events to be more likely than equivalent past events.  This effect 
proved to be largely independent of the valence or prior base rate of the 
event, at least when participants judged non-self-relevant events.  When 
participants judged self-relevant events, the timing effect was moderated 
by event valence such that participants were more likely to show the past-
future difference in likelihood estimates as the events in question became 
more positive (or at least, less negative). 
 In Chapter Three, I demonstrated that this temporal asymmetry 
arises from a tendency to see the future as more open than the past.  First, 
participants rated the future as more open, uncertain, malleable, and 
undetermined than the past, and were quicker to associate the future with 
the concept of “open” and the past with concept of “closed” than they 
were to associate future with closed and past with open.  Second, merely 
priming participants, outside of conscious awareness, with the concept of 
the future elevated likelihood judgments relative to priming participants 
with the concepts of the past or present.  This suggests the timing effect is 
due to associations made accessible when the concept of the future is 
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activated, and not to explicit feelings of accountability to the past.  
Finally, manipulating participants’ associations to the future by 
convincing them that the future is not open but is instead a closed book, 
determined by the events of the past and present, entirely eliminated the 
past-future difference in a subsequent likelihood estimation task.  This 
finding demonstrates the causal role of the belief in an open future in 
producing the timing effect in likelihood judgments, as eliminating this 
belief eliminated the effect. 
 In Chapter Four, I explored two extensions of this work, showing 
that the future-openness association has consequences not only for 
likelihood judgments but for related judgments and behaviors as well.  In 
one study, participants believed more of their peers would agree with a 
particular attitude statement in the near future than in the recent past, 
regardless of the content of the attitude statement.  In another, an archival 
analysis and a behavioral study of the way in which people visually 
represent time using timelines suggested that people associate the distant 
past with darkness but the recent past and future with lightness. 
 The findings reported here should not be taken to mean that any 
event will be seen as more probable in the future than in the past. I do not 
doubt, for example, that most people believe an individual had a greater 
chance of dying from polio 60 years ago than he or she will have 60 years 
from now.  Judgments about events whose future occurrence is limited by 
historical trends are not likely to conform to the pattern of judgment 
documented here. Instead, I would expect to see the effects reported here 
when events are uncertain, and there is no factual basis to believe that the 
events in question are more probable at one time than at another.  So, for 
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example, a couple may be more concerned about their teenage son 
throwing a party while they are away on vacation in the days leading up to 
their departure than they would be upon returning home.  A job candidate 
may feel more confident that he or she will land the job before the hiring 
committee meets to make a decision than after the committee meets.  
Voters may believe a particular candidate is more likely to win the 
election if they are asked to forecast her chances of victory before the 
polls close than if they are asked just after the polls have closed.  Because 
people’s expectations and beliefs about events guide their behavior, the 
temporal location of an event may have important implications for how 
people behave in the context of that event.  If voters see the chances of 
their preferred candidate winning the election as higher before the polls 
close, they may be less likely to take time out of their busy schedules to 
cast their vote – a decision they may come to regret soon afterward. 
Alternative Explanations 
 I have argued that the timing effect in likelihood judgments (and 
beyond) is due to a tendency to associate the future, but not the past, with 
openness and possibility.  Are there any other possible explanations for 
this effect?  One potential alternative explanation is that people feel more 
accountable to past than to future events, and thus they are more likely to 
engage in careful, deliberative reasoning, and less likely to use simple, 
confirmation-based strategies, when evaluating the likelihood of past 
events than when evaluating the likelihood of future ones.  Although this 
hypothesis has some intuitive appeal, there are a number of reasons to 
doubt its validity.  As noted in Chapter Three, in order for this 
accountability hypothesis to explain the timing effect in likelihood 
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judgments, it would have to be the case that people always start with the 
hypothesis that an event is likely to occur.  Otherwise, why would a 
tendency to engage in more confirmatory thinking when evaluating future 
events than when evaluating past events lead to consistently higher 
likelihood estimates for future events?  Because participants in Study 2 
showed the past-future difference in likelihood estimates even when 
evaluating a low base rate event (for which they are likely to start with the 
hypothesis that the event is unlikely to occur) it cannot be the case that 
people engage in more confirmatory thinking when judging future events 
than when judging past events.  Moreover, I found in Study 5 that merely 
priming participants, outside of conscious awareness, with the concept of 
future elevated likelihood estimates relative to priming participants with 
the concept of past.  It is unlikely that these results could be explained by 
feeling accountable to the past, as participants were unaware of the timing 
of information, and were engaged in a task that required rapid responding 
(such that any kind of deliberation was unlikely). 
My claim that the accountability hypothesis is unlikely to explain 
the findings presented here is bolstered by the results of a study I 
conducted using a paradigm developed by Snyder and Swann (1978).  In 
this paradigm, participants choose questions to ask of a target person in 
order to test the hypothesis that the target is extraverted, or to test the 
hypothesis that the target is introverted.  Snyder and Swann found in their 
original study that participants were biased by whichever hypothesis they 
were asked to evaluate, such that those asked to determine whether or not 
the target was extraverted were more likely to choose questions that 
would elicit extraverted answers, and less likely to choose questions that 
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would elicit introverted answers, than were those asked to determine 
whether or not the target was introverted. 
In my adaptation of this paradigm, I asked participants (n = 128) to 
determine either how the target would score on an upcoming personality 
test measuring introversion-extraversion, or how the target did score on a 
recent personality test measuring this construct.  If people approach the 
future with a more confirmation-oriented mindset than they approach the 
past, I should have found that participants were more likely to choose 
questions that would confirm whichever hypothesis they were asked to 
test (i.e., extraversion or introversion) if the personality test was still in 
the future than if the test was in the past.  I did not find this to be the case, 
however.  Although I replicated the results of Snyder and Swann (1978), 
finding that participants were more likely to choose introversion-eliciting 
questions when they tested the hypothesis that the target was an introvert 
but were more likely to choose extraversion eliciting-questions when they 
tested the hypothesis that the target was an extravert, the timing of the 
personality test (past or future) failed to moderate each of these effects.  
Using an adaptation of a well-established paradigm, then, I did not find 
evidence that people display more of a confirmation bias when evaluating 
future events than when evaluating past events.   
 Aside from the accountability hypothesis, are there any other 
potential alternative explanations that might account for the timing effect 
in likelihood judgments?  One candidate has to do with people’s affective 
reactions to past and future events.  Recent research indicates that people 
experience more affect in the present when thinking about future events 
than when thinking about past events (Van Boven & Ashworth, 2006).  
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And because future events are more affectively arousing, people attach 
greater value to them (Caruso, Gilbert & Wilson, 2007).  One may ask 
whether these effects may explain the findings documented here.  Is the 
tendency to see future events as more likely than equivalent past events 
due to the fact that future events are more affectively arousing (and people 
misinterpret this arousal to mean those events are especially likely to 
occur)?   
Although I do not have any data that speak directly to this question, 
I think this is unlikely to be the case.  First of all, many of the events I 
asked participants to judge were rather mundane, everyday events that 
seem unlikely to pack much of an affective punch.  In Study 1, for 
example, participants were asked to judge the likelihood that Jen would 
engage in activities such as calling her parents, doing her laundry, and 
going to the gym.  Similarly, in Study 3, participants judged the likelihood 
that they themselves would wear the color red, eat cereal for breakfast, 
and have a phone conversation lasting more than 30 minutes.  It seems 
unlikely that participants would experience much emotion when 
imagining any of these events, regardless of what time period they were 
considering.  Moreover, the affect account can’t explain why exposing 
participants in Study 5 to an argument that the future is predetermined 
eliminated the past-future difference in likelihood judgments.  Thus, it 
seems unlikely that differences in affective arousal can explain the 
findings documented here.  Instead, my findings and those documented by 
Van Boven, Caruso and colleagues seem to be parallel effects that 
converge to suggest that the future is “bigger,” that it looms larger in the 
mind, than does the past. 
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 One may also ask whether the timing effect in likelihood judgment 
is due to differences in the level at which people construe past versus 
future events.  Might it be the case, for example, that people construe 
future events at a more abstract level than past events, and that events 
construed at a more abstract level are perceived to be more likely than 
those construed at a more concrete level?  Although there is some data to 
indicate that people construe hypothetical future events at a more abstract 
level than real past events, it is not clear that this effect would continue to 
hold if information about past and future events was held constant (Kane, 
Van Boven & McGraw, 2007).   
Moreover, there is no evidence that high-level construals are 
associated with higher probability estimates.  If anything, the reverse may 
be true.  Recent research indicates that people construe low probability 
events at a more abstract level than high probability events (Todorov, 
Goren & Trope, 2007; Wakslak, Trope, Liberman & Alony, 2006).  
Wakslak et al. (2006) suggest that this effect may be bidirectional – that 
behaviors construed at a low level, in terms of how they are performed 
rather than why, may then be seen as more likely to occur than those 
construed at a high level.  Note that if this were true, future events would 
have to be construed at a more concrete level than past events in order for 
construal level to be responsible for the effect of timing on likelihood 
judgments.  Because this is inconsistent both with intuition and with data 
indicating that people provide more detailed accounts of past than of 
future events (Bavelas, 1973; Weick, 1979), I believe it is unlikely that 
construal level can account for the tendency to see future events as more 
likely than equivalent past events. 
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Boundary Conditions 
 Although I have replicated the timing effect in likelihood 
judgments in a number of studies, not all of my attempts to document this 
effect have been successful.  In some investigations I have failed to obtain 
a past-future difference, whereas in others I have found an interaction 
between timing and event valence such that positive outcomes are judged 
to be more likely, but negative outcomes are judged to be less likely, in 
the future than in the past.  By briefly reviewing those studies here, I hope 
to shed some light on the boundary conditions of this effect. 
 The work presented in this dissertation was initially inspired by a 
study by Rothbart and Snyder (1970), who found that participants betting 
on the outcome of a die roll expressed more confidence in their bets, and 
were willing to wager more money on them, if they were allowed to 
predict the outcome of the roll in advance than if they were asked to 
postdict the outcome after the die had been rolled (but before they were 
allowed to see the outcome).  I was interested in whether their results 
stemmed, as they argued, from magical thinking in contexts that 
encourage illusory perceptions of control, or whether they could be seen 
as part of a broader tendency to judge any focal outcome to be more likely 
in the future than in the past.  My attempts to replicate Rothbart and 
Snyder’s findings using slightly different procedures have not been 
successful, however.  In one study I asked participants to guess the 
outcome of a past or future coin flip, and to rate their confidence in their 
prediction/postdiction.  In another I asked participants to roll a die and to 
rate, either before or after rolling the die, the likelihood of rolling a 
specific number (previously identified as a number that would ensure 
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them either a monetary gain or a monetary loss).  In a third study I asked 
participants either to predict or to postdict the likelihood of the 
experimenter drawing a specific card (which they were told would lead to 
either a positive or a negative outcome) from a deck of tarot cards.  In 
none of these studies did I find a past-future difference in confidence or 
likelihood ratings. 
 Why did I fail to replicate the results obtained by Rothbart and 
Snyder (1970)?  Although I do not know exactly why these studies failed 
to produce a reliable past-future difference, several possibilities are worth 
considering.  One is that events that are just moments into the future do 
not seem as open and full of possibility as those that are farther away.  
Indeed, these events may be more likely to be incorporated into one’s 
representation of the present than into one’s representation of the future, 
and hence be unlikely to prompt elevated likelihood estimates.  A certain 
amount of temporal distance between the present and the to-be-predicted 
event might be necessary in order to obtain a reliable timing effect. 
 A second possibility has to do with the fact that in each of these 
studies there were two main outcomes associated with the uncertain event 
– winning versus losing.  Events for which there are only two equally 
salient outcomes may be unlikely to show a past-future difference, as 
thinking about one outcome may automatically trigger thoughts about its 
complement.  This would lead to a perception that either event is likely to 
occur in the future, and hence to probability estimates closer to 50-50.  
The timing effect may be most likely to occur when there are many 
outcomes that may occur in a given time period (such as the many 
different activities a college student may engage in during a one-week 
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period) or when the complement of the focal outcome is not as salient as 
the focal outcome itself, as when the two outcomes consist of an event 
happening or an event not happening (such as attempting suicide versus 
not attempting suicide).   
Another possibility has to do with the role of motivation in 
predicting self-relevant outcomes.  Recall that in Study 3, in which 
participants judged their own chances of experiencing a variety of events, 
the main effect of timing on participants’ likelihood judgments was 
qualified by an interaction between timing and event valence.  The more 
positive an event was, the more likely participants were to see it as more 
probable in the future than in the past.  This is not the only study in which 
I observed an interaction between timing and event valence.  Indeed, in 
another study I asked Cornell students (n = 189) to judge the likelihood 
(on a 1 to 9 scale) of either a win or a loss for the Cornell football team, 
either several hours before or several hours after a game in which Cornell 
faced off against Brown University.10  I found a significant interaction 
between the timing of the judgment and whether participants were asked 
to judge the likelihood of a win or a loss, F(1, 185) = 4.37, p < .05.  
Participants believed it was more likely that Cornell would win the game 
if they were making their judgments prior to the game than if they were 
doing so after the game had already occurred (Ms = 5.1 and 4.6, SDs = 1.7 
and 1.9, respectively).  Conversely, participants believed it less likely that 
Cornell would lose the game if they were making their judgments prior to 
the game than if they were making them after the game had occurred (Ms 
                                                
10 The few respondents in the past condition who knew the outcome of the game were 
excluded. 
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= 5.3 and 5.7, SDs = 1.8 and 1.8, respectively).   
I also asked participants, in a forced choice format, to 
predict/postdict the outcome of the game.  Among participants asked to 
indicate which team they thought would win the game, 67% of those 
asked before the game selected Cornell as the winner, as compared to 
only 45% of those asked after the game, χ2 = 4.65, p < .05.  Among 
participants asked to indicate which team they thought would lose the 
game, only 38% of those asked before the game selected Cornell as the 
loser, as compared to 68% of those asked after the game, χ2 = 8.54, p < 
.01.  These results show a clear tendency for participants to make more 
optimistic judgments when predicting the future than when postdicting the 
past.  Instead of a main effect of timing, such that participants thought that 
either outcome (a win or a loss for Cornell) was more likely in the future 
than in the past, I found an interaction between timing and outcome, such 
that participants thought a win was more likely but a loss was less likely 
in the future than in the past.   
 Thus, people do not invariably judge all uncertain outcomes as 
more likely in the future than in the past – in certain cases they judge 
positive events to be more likely but negative events to be less likely in 
the future than in the past.  What does the Cornell football study have in 
common with Study 3?  I would argue that in both cases, people were 
making self-relevant judgments.  College students typically take a certain 
amount of pride in their institution’s sports teams, such that a win for the 
school team is a win for the self and a loss for the school team is a loss for 
the self (Cialdini et al., 1976).  Thus, the tendency for participants to 
make more optimistic predictions before the Cornell-Brown game than 
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afterward may have resulted from the relevance of the Cornell team’s 
success for participants’ self-esteem.  This conjecture is supported by the 
observation that the tendency for future optimism appears to be stronger 
among participants who reported caring quite a lot about the game, 
relative to those who reported caring very little about the game (although 
the corresponding three-way interaction between timing, outcome, and 
investment in the game did not quite achieve statistical significance, β = 
.435, t(181) = 1.48, p = .14). 
 If people are motivated to predict that they will experience good 
things and avoid bad things in the future, this tendency may be at odds 
with the tendency to see focal events (both positive and negative) as more 
possible in the future than in the past.  This may explain why the past-
future asymmetry in likelihood is less reliable for self-relevant outcomes 
than for those that are not self-relevant, at times producing an interaction 
with event valence and at times producing no effect at all (i.e., when the 
lack of an effect for negative events weakens the overall effect of timing, 
resulting in a non-significant main effect).  Understanding exactly when 
the motivation to see the future as bright and positive will trump the 
tendency to see it as wide open should be a focus of future research. 
Future Directions 
In addition to examining the role of motivation or self-relevance in 
moderating the past-future timing effect, future research could focus on a 
number of different questions.  First, what role do individual differences 
play in this effect?  I have argued that the timing effect in likelihood 
judgments is due to a tendency to associate the future with openness and 
possibility.  It is likely, however, that certain groups of people do not hold 
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this association to the same degree as the participants in my studies.  Most 
of my participants were college students at an elite American university, 
and likely had good reason to see the future as open and full of possibility.  
People for whom the future is more restricted, such as those living in 
poverty, may be unlikely to show these effects.  Similarly, older adults see 
the future as more limited than do younger adults (Lang & Carstensen, 
2002).  Would the timing effect be reduced, or even reversed, among the 
elderly?  Finally, if this phenomenon does indeed arise from a tendency to 
see the future as “open,” we might expect it to be attenuated in cultures, 
societies, or individuals who have a more fatalistic or deterministic 
worldview.   
A second question for future research concerns the role of focalism 
in producing this effect.  I have argued that people assign higher 
likelihood estimates to uncertain future events than to equivalent past 
events because they see all things as more possible in the future than in 
the past.  But why should this be the case?  If all things are seen as more 
possible in the future, then why isn’t any particular event seen as less 
likely?  The answer lies, I believe, in the tendency for people to focus 
narrowly on the hypothesis at hand to the neglect of alternative 
possibilities.  When asked to judge the likelihood that Jen will go to a 
party in the coming week, people think about party possibilities and fail to 
consider all of the other obligations Jen might have in a given week.  And 
since the future is associated with possibility more so than the past, they 
see the possibility of her attending a party as greater in the coming week 
than in the past week.  If my argument is correct, and focalism is 
necessary for the timing effect to occur, then defocusing people before 
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they make likelihood estimates should eliminate, and perhaps even 
reverse, this effect.  In the context of the Jen study, this could be 
accomplished by asking participants to first list everything that a typical 
college student might do in an average week.  I would expect that, after 
being defocused in this manner, participants would judge future events to 
be equal in likelihood to, or perhaps even less likely than, past events.  
When judging a future event under normal circumstances, participants 
might be likely to say to themselves, “Sure, she might go to a party.”  But 
after being defocused, participants might be more likely to say to 
themselves, “Sure, she might go to a party, but she might be too busy 
studying, hanging out with friends, working a part-time job, writing 
papers, doing her laundry, traveling, or having friends in town.”  This 
would lead to an absence of a timing effect in likelihood judgments, or 
perhaps a reversal if listing events causes people to now see all of the 
events they listed as viable possibilities in the future (and hence each of 
the individual events as less likely). 
A third question of interest is whether people literally see the future 
as “bigger” than the past.  As discussed in the concluding section of 
Chapter Four, to the extent that the future appears more open, more 
positive, and more expansive than the past, it may loom larger in the mind 
such that people expect future events to be bigger than equivalent past 
events.  If this were the case, we might expect people to provide greater 
estimates for sums or quantities if they are predicting the future than if 
they are postdicting the past.  Moreover, as in Study 8, we might expect 
them to actually depict the future as bigger than the past when asked to 
draw future and past events.  In a preliminary test of this latter hypothesis, 
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I asked a sample of participants to draw a scary-looking bug that they 
might encounter in their kitchen late at night.  Some participants were 
asked to imagine encountering that bug on the following weekend, 
whereas others were asked to imagine encountering that bug on the 
previous weekend.  These drawings were then measured by making the 
smallest rectangle possible around the drawing of the bug and measuring 
the area of this rectangle.  Participants in this study did indeed draw a 
larger bug if they imagined encountering it in the future than if they 
imagined encountering it in the past (Ms = 15,603 and 8,306 sq mm, SDs 
= 10,774 and 4,599 sq mm, respectively; t(27) = 2.31, p = .029).11  I have 
not been able to replicate this effect using other objects (such as an ice 
cream sundae or a stain on one’s favorite shirt), however, so whether or 
not this effect is reliable remains a question for future research. 
Conclusion 
 Psychologists have long been interested in the effects of time on 
judgment and behavior.  Until quite recently, however, all of the research 
on this topic has focused on temporal distance – that is, on how 
perceptions and behavior are influenced by how far into the past or how 
far into the future an event lies.  Temporal construal theory, for example, 
has demonstrated that distant future events are construed at a more 
abstract level than near future events (Trope & Liberman, 2003).  
Theories of temporal discounting have examined how the value that 
people attach to an event varies as a function of how far into the future 
that event will occur (Frederick, Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2002).  
                                                
11 Although I report the raw means and standard deviations, the data in the future 
condition were positively skewed and thus the significance test was conducted 
following a natural log transformation. 
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And research on primacy and recency effects has shown that information 
is interpreted differently depending on how recently that information was 
encountered (Jones & Goethals, 1987). 
But very few investigations to date have examined how the 
temporal location (past or future) of an event influences how people 
interpret that event.  This dissertation is an attempt to broaden the 
literature on the timing of events to include comparisons of past and 
future events.  My research suggests that people associate the future with 
openness, possibility, and positivity more so than the past, and that this 
has implications for people’s beliefs about the likelihood of past and 
future events as well as how people depict those events.  Because research 
on this topic is still in its infancy, there are many questions yet to be 
answered regarding what types of judgments and behaviors are subject to 
a past-future asymmetry and exactly what mechanisms underlie these 
effects.  I am confident, however, that future research will make 
significant advances toward answering these questions.  After all, the 
future is wide open.
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APPENDIX 
Into the Great Wide Open: Why Scholars Say the Future is Unknowable 
 Philosophers have long argued about the nature of time.  Is the 
future a “great wide open,” where anything can happen? 
 Scholars now say that the answer to that question is a resounding 
“yes.” 
 “Science is a powerful tool for isolating particular causes and 
understanding how those causes produce their effects,” said Dr. Arthur 
Fiske, a professor of internal medicine at Johns Hopkins University. “But 
science is a micro-level tool.  We still can’t make predictions about 
complex events, such as how a particular patient will respond to a 
treatment, how an ecosystem will be changed by the removal of a 
particular species, or even how some types of matter will behave in a 
laboratory situation.” 
 Although they have identified some of the laws that govern 
physical events, scientists say, most of the operations of the universe still 
remain a mystery.  Given the sheer number of factors that influence any 
given event, it is virtually impossible to say with certainty what will 
happen in the future. 
 “Although it’s theoretically possible to have complete knowledge 
of physical matter and the laws governing that matter at any one time, in 
reality we don’t have this kind of knowledge,” said Dr. Robert DiPietro, 
professor of chemistry at Harvard University.  “So we just can’t know 
what the future holds.” 
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 These claims are bolstered by recent advances in quantum theory, 
which casts doubt on the possibility that scientists can ever have complete 
knowledge of the workings of the universe. 
 In classical physics, it was believed that if one knew the initial state 
of a system with infinite precision, one could predict the behavior of the 
system infinitely far into the future.  According to the modern theory of 
quantum mechanics, however, there is a fundamental limit on the ability 
to make such predictions, because of the inability to collect the initial data 
with unlimited precision. 
 “Quantum mechanics provides probabilistic results because the 
physical universe is itself probabilistic rather than deterministic,” said Dr. 
Anne Cho, professor of theoretical physics at California Institute of 
Technology. “In essence, many different worlds are possible, and we 
don’t know until the moment arrives which possible world we will 
experience.” 
 Findings such as these have implications for a number of academic 
disciplines, most notably philosophy.  Indeed, philosophers are now 
looking to the sciences to help revise theories of time and space.  
 “Research in the hard sciences in now supporting the argument 
many philosophers have made for centuries, that the future is 
indeterminate,” said Alan Koutsioroumbus, professor of philosophy at 
Swarthmore College.  “It cannot be predicted before it occurs, and in this 
way, the future is wide open.” 
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A Closed Book: Why Scholars Say the Future is Predetermined 
 Philosophers have long argued about the nature of time.  Is the 
future predetermined by the events of the past and present, like a novel 
whose ending, although unknown to the reader, is already written? 
 Scholars now say that the answer to that question is a resounding 
“yes.” 
 “Science is a powerful tool for isolating particular causes and 
understanding how those causes produce their effects,” said Dr. Arthur 
Fiske, a professor of internal medicine at Johns Hopkins University. 
“Using science, we have learned that all events are causally determined by 
the events that precede them.  In this way, the future is already fixed by 
the events of the past and present.” 
 Although the sheer number of factors that influence any given 
event makes it difficult in everyday life to predict what will happen next, 
scientists say, if it were possible to measure every one of these factors 
scientists could compute the time and place of every event that will ever 
occur. 
 “Once the initial conditions of the universe have been established 
the rest of the history of the universe follows inevitably,” said Dr. Robert 
DiPietro, professor of chemistry at Harvard University.  “In this sense, the 
basic particles of the universe operate in the same fashion as the rolling 
balls on a billiard table, moving and striking each other in predictable 
ways to produce predictable results.” 
 These claims are bolstered by recent advances in chaos theory, 
which, despite its misleading name, posits that the universe is 
deterministic and that events that look random on the surface can be 
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traced back to prior, eliciting condition.  The most well-known example 
of the theory, the “butterfly effect,” illustrates how a seemingly 
inconsequential event, such as the flapping of a butterfly’s wings in 
Brazil, can initiate a chain of events that results in serious consequences, 
such as a tornado in Texas. 
 “Chaos theory can predict the behavior of a variety of complex 
systems, including the weather, plate tectonics, the solar system, 
economics, and population growth, just to name a few,” said Dr. Anne 
Cho, professor of theoretical physics at California Institute of 
Technology. “Even these seemingly chaotic events are the products of a 
very orderly, fully deterministic universe.” 
 Findings such as these have implications for a number of academic 
disciplines, most notably philosophy.  Indeed, philosophers are now 
looking to the sciences to help revise theories of time and space.  
 “Research in the hard sciences in now supporting the argument 
many philosophers have made for centuries, that the future is 
predetermined,” said Alan Koutsioroumbus, professor of philosophy at 
Swarthmore College.  “Every event is perfectly predictable from the 
events that proceeded it, so even if we don’t yet know the ending, the 
future is a closed book.” 
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